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
  
ABSTRACT 
The Political Fourth Amendment builds on Justice Ginsburg’s recent 
dissent in Herring v. United States to argue for a “more majestic 
conception” of the Fourth Amendment focused on protecting political 
liberty. To put the point dramatically, we misread the Fourth Amendment 
when we read it exclusively as a criminal procedure provision focused 
entirely on either regulating police or protecting privacy. In order to see 
the Fourth Amendment as contributing to the Constitution’s protections 
for political liberty, and not simply as an invitation to regulate police 
practice, we must take seriously the fact that the Fourth Amendment’s 
textual purpose is to secure a “right of the people,” which places it 
textually alongside the First, Second, and Ninth Amendments that 
similarly seek to protect the “right[s] of the people.” Narratives focused 
on regulating police or protecting privacy each risk blinding us to the 
Fourth Amendment’s broader constitutional setting. By looking at the 
historical origins of the Fourth Amendment in relation to substantive First 
Amendment concerns, and examining the textual significance of protecting 
a “right of the people,” this Article argues that the two dominant 
narratives overlook a central political purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 
The political Fourth Amendment seeks to protect the political liberties of 
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the sovereign “People.” Focused exclusively on protecting privacy by 
regulating police practice, current Fourth Amendment doctrine offers no 
protection to anything a person knowingly exposes to others, a hazard in 
an era of electronic social networking. Reading the Fourth Amendment 
back into the Constitution makes available new grounds for the 
Constitution’s relevance in an age of pervasive electronic surveillance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world of increased government surveillance of both public 
and private spheres of our lives, despite past warnings of possible future 
harm. Writing in dissent from the Supreme Court‘s confidential informant 
cases, Justice Douglas warned that the ―privacy and dignity of our citizens 
is being whittled away by sometimes imperceptible steps.‖1 As a 
consequence of technological developments, we risk creating ―a society in 
which government may intrude into the secret regions of man‘s life at 
will.‖2 As the sphere of life held private from government surveillance 
 
 
 1. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 2. Id. Justice Douglas also notes that police employed peepholes to spy in men‘s bathrooms to 
try to discover homosexuals, while intruding into very private regions of one‘s life. Id. at 342–43; see 
David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of 
Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 875, 880 (2008) (―Homosexuality and its policing . . . 
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shrinks, Justice Douglas observed that a time may come ―when the most 
confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying 
ears. When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone.‖3  
Impassioned dissents provide good prose, but may not always provide 
clarity of thought. Indeed, sounding the totalitarian bugle in a post–Cold 
War era may ring a bit disharmonious. This era has produced vast new 
technologies enabling many new means of intimate conversation among 
friends. These technological tools are familiar to us all. E-mail, text 
messaging, electronic social networking, and wireless mobile 
communication devices allow us many different ways to keep track of our 
friends and associates. The problem that provides continuing relevance to 
Justice Douglas‘s dissent is that under current Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, all of these tools are constitutionally available to ―eager, prying 
ears,‖4 because none of them involves attempts by the speaker to keep 
information private—that is, secret.  
Under the ―third-party‖ doctrine, a person loses Fourth Amendment 
protections over anything she knowingly exposes to another person.
5
 The 
Supreme Court ―consistently has held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.‖6 As Chief Justice Roberts articulated the doctrine, ―[i]f an 
individual shares information, papers, or places with another, he assumes 
the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information 
or those papers or places with the government.‖7 This doctrine extends to 
features of everyday life, such as the numbers one dials on the phone,
8
 the 
transactions one conducts with a bank,
9
 or the location one conveys to 
onlookers when in public.
10
 Because under the third-party doctrine the 
Fourth Amendment protects only the privacy of information or activities 
 
 
were an important part of the background against which the Court constructed the modern 
constitutional law of the criminal process.‖).  
 3. See Osborn, 385 U.S. at 354 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 4. Id. By contrast, delivery of sealed mail is unavailable to prying eyes. See Ex parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (―The constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their 
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their papers, thus closed against 
inspection, wherever they may be.‖).  
 5. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 128 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Regarding shared 
common areas, the Court has stated that co-occupants have ―assumed the risk that one of their number 
might permit [a] common area to be searched.‖ United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 
(1974).  
 8. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743. 
 9. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 10. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).  
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withheld from others, the Court construes much of everyday life as no 
longer undisclosed, and therefore fully available to government officials. 
Although scholars have widely criticized this doctrine,
11
 it readily follows 
from the Court‘s narrow construction of privacy as what remains 
undisclosed. In a robust socially networked world, Fourth Amendment 
privacy by itself may offer little constitutional guidance or protection.
12
  
We face a constitutional dilemma. Either we accept the existing 
limited, and increasingly irrelevant, Fourth Amendment protections for 
privacy, or we must seek to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment by seeing 
how it functions within a more comprehensive constitutional framework.
13
 
This Article argues that the Fourth Amendment makes a distinctive 
contribution to a broader constitutional framework aimed at protecting 
political liberty.  
Justice Douglas‘s dissent is noteworthy because he recognizes the 
interrelation between privacy, dignity, and liberty. So far, the primary 
melody of Fourth Amendment protections has sounded in privacy alone, 
with dignity and liberty interests playing only an occasional background 
note.
14
 Yet liberty fits more comfortably within a Constitution whose 
 
 
 11. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349 (1974); Sherry F. Colb, What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine 
and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 123 (2002) (criticizing the Court for ―equating 
risk-taking with inviting exposure and equating limited-audience with whole-world self-exposure‖); 
Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 
CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1635 (1987) (―A view of the world that recognizes the essential 
interconnectedness of people and the importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign to the atomistic 
social theory underlying the Court‘s present doctrine.‖); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment 
Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 
753 (2005) (―The third party doctrine presents one of the most serious threats to privacy in the digital 
age.‖); see also Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society,” 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (employing surveys to reveal ―societal 
understandings‖ of privacy and finding that ―some of the Court‘s conclusions . . . may be well off the 
mark‖). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 564 
(2009) (defending the third-party doctrine).  
 12. See Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”: Expectations of Privacy, False 
Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 
IND. L. REV. 253, 284 (2006) (―The harm that the Amendment protects against is the loss of the sense 
of security that inevitably accompanies the idea that no matter where one is, and no matter what one 
does, the government may be listening or watching.‖). 
 13. Posing a similar question, Jack Balkin asks: ―The question is not whether we will have a 
surveillance state in the years to come, but what sort of surveillance state we will have. Will we have a 
government without sufficient controls over public and private surveillance, or will we have a 
government that protects individual dignity and conforms both public and private surveillance to the 
rule of law?‖ Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
3–4 (2008).  
 14. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 
YALE L.J. 1151, 1213–14 (2004). 
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purpose is to ―secure the Blessings of Liberty‖ for ―We the People.‖15 
Liberty is realized in public as well as private, collectively as well as 
individually, creating the space for ―the People‖ to exercise their sovereign 
power. Moreover, the Fourth Amendment looks very different when read 
alongside the First, Second, and Ninth Amendments, all of which protect 
―right[s] of the people,‖ than when it is read among the criminal process 
provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which focus on rights of 
―the accused‖ or ―a person.‖ Read in light of the Amendments protecting 
political liberty, we can more easily see the Fourth Amendment‘s role 
within a scheme of ordered liberty designed for political purposes.
16
 The 
ability to see the Fourth Amendment in this light is obscured by prevailing 
doctrine.  
Current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence governing searches contains 
two contrasting narratives, one focused on regulating police and the other 
on protecting privacy.
17
 Sometimes the two narratives coordinate; 
regulation of police can be privacy protecting. At other times the 
narratives diverge. Two recent Supreme Court decisions illustrate the 
divergence. In Arizona v. Gant, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme 
Court placed limitations on the search incident to an arrest near an 
automobile, citing the imperative of protecting privacy interests.
18
 A 
vigorous dissent, citing the need to provide bright-line rules to guide 
police practice, failed to mention the value of privacy at all.
19
 In Herring v. 
United States, a different five-to-four majority held that the exclusionary 
rule did not apply to searches based on negligent records maintained by 
state officials, emphasizing the minimal deterrent effect for police 
misconduct, while also failing to consider relevant privacy interests.
20
 
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg altered the usual Fourth Amendment 
narrative, focusing not on the privacy implications of the search and 
seizure, but on the liberty interests at stake.
21
 Here, Justice Douglas‘s 
equating of Fourth Amendment liberty with privacy interests is recast in a 
new jurisprudential light. By reading the Fourth Amendment to protect 
liberty, Justice Ginsburg opens up the possibility of protecting the public 
 
 
 15. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 16. The modern development of the Fourth Amendment was focused on vindicating the 
―freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.‖ Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) 
(quotation omitted).  
 17. See infra notes 36–51 and accompanying text. 
 18. 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720, 1723–24 (2009).  
 19. Id. at 1726–32 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 20. 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009). 
 21. Id. at 706–07 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
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and political lives of individuals who have chosen not to remain secreted 
away from others. In so doing, protections for political liberty may sweep 
more broadly than the Court‘s current protections for privacy. 
Constitutional discourse that moves beyond the twin narratives of 
regulating police and protecting privacy allows us to see how the Fourth 
Amendment protects popular sovereignty and public association, in 
addition to private life.  
Put dramatically, we misread the Fourth Amendment when we read it 
to protect no more than a ―reasonable expectation of privacy,‖ as the Court 
has done since Katz v. United States.
22
 Privacy is no doubt an important 
constitutional value, protected not only by the Fourth Amendment, but 
also by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
23
 
But privacy exclusiveness ignores a ―more majestic conception‖24 of the 
Fourth Amendment that protects a political ―right of the people‖ to 
organize community life free from pervasive government surveillance and 
interference. Similar problems arise when scholars and courts view the 
Fourth Amendment primarily as a special provision of constitutional 
criminal procedure designed to regulate police practice.
25
 As Akhil Amar 
argues, by reading the Fourth Amendment as part of a special group of 
criminal procedure provisions, ―we miss . . . how the Fourth Amendment 
connects up with the rest of the Constitution.‖26 Yet despite the severity of 
his criticism of other scholars, Amar persists in reading the Fourth 
Amendment in the context of constitutional criminal procedure.
27
 He 
 
 
 22. 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 23. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (protecting ―a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter‖); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
 24. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 25. This Article is not alone in observing the existence of a problematic gap between Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, 
Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1993) (―Along 
with the other provisions of the Bill of Rights linked to the criminal justice system, the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment has been consigned to a category labeled ‗criminal procedure‘ that is generally treated 
as distinct from ‗constitutional law.‘‖) (footnote omitted). 
 26. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 2 
(1997). 
 27. Regarding the purported widespread misreading of the Fourth Amendment, Amar claims that 
―Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner—rudderless and badly off course—yet most 
scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs.‖ Id. To put us back on course, Amar 
provides functional solutions rooted in different textual readings for the same criminal procedure 
questions: when may state officials conduct searches, how should criminal trials view tainted evidence, 
and what remedies should be available for illegal police conduct? Id. at 31–45. These are important 
questions. They are, however, focused on regulating police conduct through court procedure, not on 
the articulation of constitutional values through which additional remedies may be possible. 
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focuses on its reasonableness requirement to govern police practice, 
contests reliance on the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings, and 
finds a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures in the right to civil 
juries protected by the Seventh Amendment.
28
 These considerations all fit 
comfortably within the first principles of criminal procedure. If this is as 
far as the Amendment ―connects up with the rest of the Constitution,‖ then 
we fail to see how the Fourth Amendment furthers core constitutional 
principles of political liberty sharing a textual mandate to protect a ―right 
of the people.‖  
―We the People‖ sought both active participation in political life and 
negative constraints on government interference. Benjamin Constant 
emphasized this difference between the ―liberty of the ancients‖ and the 
―liberty of the moderns,‖ separating collective political participation from 
individual civil freedom.
29
 Isaiah Berlin makes a related distinction 
between positive and negative theories of liberty, emphasizing the 
potential for conflict between freedom from constraint and freedom of 
self-fulfillment.
30
 Although these two forms of liberty can pull in different 
directions, political liberty requires both freedom from unwarranted 
government intrusion into spheres of our lives, as well as public and 
political interaction among ―the People.‖31 The Bill of Rights reflects both 
these aspects of liberty. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination protects a right to keep information to oneself, while the 
First Amendment right of assembly protects shared public political 
activity.
32
 Above all, political liberty requires a particular kind of security 
in the dignity of one‘s person and the integrity of one‘s interactions with 
others.
33
 Privacy, as that which is withheld from others, sounds primarily 
 
 
 28. See id. at 30–31. Elsewhere, Amar has argued that ―[i]nstead of being studied holistically, the 
Bill has been chopped up into discrete chunks of text, with each bit examined in isolation.‖ Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131 (1991). 
 29. See BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, 
in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309–28 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed., 1988).  
 30. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118–72 (1969); 
see also ISAIAH BERLIN, THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 
12–13 (Henry Hardy ed., Alfred A. Knopf 1991) (1990) (―[L]iberty—without some modicum of which 
there is no choice and therefore no possibility of remaining human as we understand the word—may 
have to be curtailed in order to make room for social welfare, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, 
to shelter the homeless, to leave room for the liberty of others, to allow justice or fairness to be 
exercised.‖). 
 31. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 6 
(2005) (advancing ―a democratic theme—‗active liberty‘—which resonates throughout the 
Constitution‖).  
 32. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, IV. 
 33. This security is a structural feature of our Constitution‘s design. ―Political liberty in a citizen 
is that tranquileity of spirit which comes from the opinion each one has of his security, and in order for 
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within the narrow theme of negative liberty. Full protection of political 
liberty requires more. To say how much more invites a more complete 
interaction with this longstanding political theory debate.
34
 For present 
purposes, it should suffice to notice that constitutional provisions such as 
the First Amendment do more than constrain government, but provide the 
tools necessary for fulfilling ―the People‘s‖ democratic aspirations. 
―Political liberty‖ is a placeholder for constitutional values that sweep 
more broadly than narrow conceptions of privacy to encompass our 
interpersonal and public lives made vulnerable to oppressive state 
interference. Neither exclusive focus on protecting privacy nor regulating 
police—the two dominant Fourth Amendment narratives—adequately 
reflects the Constitution‘s pervasive purpose to secure political liberty.35  
If the Constitution from the preamble onward seeks to protect liberty, 
then what does the Fourth Amendment contribute that is distinctive? All of 
the Amendments, as well as the structural features of the Constitution, 
seek in some way to establish a government that secures and promotes the 
liberty of persons. What is the Fourth Amendment‘s distinctive 
contribution if it is not to protect privacy and regulate the institutions, such 
as the modern police, most likely to invade a person‘s privacy? Political 
liberty is multifaceted. Among other features, it requires both the 
opportunity and ability to assemble, speak, and petition; it requires 
substantive protections for intimate aspects of ―the People‘s‖ lives; it 
requires official process to accord with principles of fairness; and it 
requires governing officials to respect ―the People‘s‖ security in their 
persons and homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth 
Amendment protects this latter facet of liberty, enabling freedom of 
 
 
him to have this liberty the government must be such that one citizen cannot fear another citizen.‖ 
CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 157 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1750); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered 
Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1514 (1991) (examining the ―link between constitutional structure 
and liberty‖).  
 34. Although the differences can be more complicated, on the side of negative liberty, one finds 
works such as THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91, 145–54 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1996) (1651) and F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960). On the side of positive liberty, 
one finds works such as JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Of The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 78–80 (Victor Gourevitch trans. & ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1997) (1762) and 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 211–29 (1985).  
 35. Other scholars have also expressed growing skepticism about the dominant privacy 
paradigm. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 356 (1998) (―[T]he essential attribute of the right to be 
secure is the ability of the individual to exclude the government from intruding.‖); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment ―should stop 
trying to protect privacy‖).  
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movement and social interaction in private and in public, secure from 
arbitrary search and seizure. The problem is that the Supreme Court has 
lost sight of how the Fourth Amendment fits into a broader political liberty 
framework, as it has increasingly focused on protecting a narrow 
conception of privacy and regulating everyday police practice. Although I 
purposefully leave the contours of ―political liberty‖ vague, public 
interaction and coordination between persons require protection for these 
basic liberties—ones that enable both self-determination and collective 
interaction.
36
 Fourth Amendment liberty protects public associations in 
addition to private life. Fourth Amendment liberty protects forms of social 
interaction otherwise subject to stultifying surveillance and pervasive 
interference.
37
 Finally, Fourth Amendment liberty allows us to see how 
rights against search and seizure coordinate with rights to speak and 
assemble.  
In what follows, Part I examines the contrasting narratives of 
regulating police and protecting privacy, reading the Fourth Amendment 
in light of parallel First Amendment rationales. I argue that Justice 
Ginsburg‘s reorientation of the Fourth Amendment toward protecting the 
liberty of ―the People‖ to live free from unwarranted government intrusion 
into their lives fits well with First Amendment protections for freedom of 
speech against the state censor. Part II traces the Fourth Amendment‘s 
central value as protecting liberty from its origins in seditious libel cases. 
These origins provide a close connection with First Amendment interests, 
focusing on the liberty of individual persons as well as ―the People.‖ Part 
III argues that the Fourth Amendment‘s protection of a ―right of the 
people‖ is textually significant and mostly ignored or misread by scholars 
and courts. The Fourth Amendment speaks in the voice of the sovereign 
―People,‖ protecting a ―right of the people,‖ and provides security in the 
plural, preserving ―the People‖ in ―their . . . houses.‖ These linguistic 
 
 
 36. I want to avoid having to set priorities among the constitutionally protected liberties. Instead, 
my goal is to demonstrate the important and overlooked value of a broader conception of Fourth 
Amendment liberty ignored when we focus on protecting privacy (and regulating police practice). In 
this context, John Rawls claims that ―[t]he worth of one such liberty normally depends upon the 
specification of the other liberties.‖ JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 178 (rev. ed. 1999). If 
government can seize a person‘s papers at will, then the worth of free speech would be greatly 
diminished.  
 37. Focusing on political liberty also emphasizes the shared and social multiplicity on which a 
vibrant political body relies. Focusing on privacy tends to emphasize the normalizing influence of the 
state for individuals. As Jed Rubenfeld states well, ―[t]he danger, then, is a particular kind of creeping 
totalitarianism, an unarmed occupation of individuals‘ lives. That is the danger of . . . a society 
standardized and normalized, in which lives are too substantially or too rigidly directed.‖ Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 784 (1989). 
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choices are not accidents of drafting. They place the Fourth Amendment as 
much in the company of the First Amendment as they do other criminal 
process provisions. As this Article argues, textual placement of protecting 
a ―right of the people‖ indicates a political purpose better suited to 
protecting liberty than privacy alone. In light of the Supreme Court‘s 
opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Part IV argues that we have a model of 
reading the Constitution in light of its broader purpose of preserving and 
protecting political liberty. Rather than reading the Amendment as an 
exclusive invitation to create doctrinal regulations for police practice, 
Lawrence suggests how Fourth Amendment values coordinate with 
constitutionally pervasive protections for liberty, transcending narrow 
doctrinal frameworks. Finally, this Article argues that the Fourth 
Amendment should be read back into the Constitution to play an available 
role in securing public democratic participation and to address pressing 
issues raised by increased capacities for intrusive government surveillance. 
 I. TWO VISIONS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSE: PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND REGULATING POLICE 
The Fourth Amendment provides: ―The right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.‖38 There is a lot packed into this one Amendment, but the basic 
modern doctrinal framework is fairly straightforward. Most searches and 
many seizures must be authorized in advance by a warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate on a showing of probable cause.
39
 A central purpose 
behind the Fourth Amendment doctrine is to protect privacy. The Supreme 
Court has explained: ―The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy of one‘s person, 
house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is the unjustified 
 
 
 38. Id.  
 39. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (―[W]arrants are generally required to search a person's home 
or his person unless ‗the exigencies of the situation‘ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling 
that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.‖); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (―[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only 
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.‖ (footnotes omitted)). 
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governmental invasion of these areas of an individual's life.‖40 This simple 
statement belies the complexity of the general framework with its many 
exceptions and permutations. Privacy is not the lone purpose animating the 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. Regulating police practice is also a core 
purpose driving doctrinal developments, as the Court makes clear that ―[a] 
single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have 
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and 
individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront.‖41  
Fourth Amendment doctrine makes very specific judgments about 
where, when, what, and how police may investigate. The Supreme Court 
has resolved whether police may examine paper bags located in cars,
42
 
crumpled cigarette packages found in coat pockets,
43
 garbage placed for 
disposal by the city,
44
 the heat emanating from a house,
45
 and greenhouses 
observed from the airspace above.
46
 The Supreme Court has further 
resolved whether police may examine records revealed to third parties,
47
 
whether they may listen to conversations among cohorts,
48
 and whether 
they may become undercover informants in a group or association.
49
 With 
answers to these questions and more, the Court has fashioned a doctrine to 
regulate police behavior in order to protect privacy. As more outrageous 
police behavior—torture,50 forced stomach pumping,51 and unwarranted 
home invasion
52—has yielded to constitutional regulation, criminal 
procedure has become more refined and judicial guidance more difficult to 
apply. Recognizing this, the Court often attempts to simplify constitutional 
rules, mindful of ―the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by 
an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be 
 
 
 40. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 
640, 648 (1983); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981).  
 41. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979).  
 42. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991). 
 43. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
 44. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
 45. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 46. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–14 
(1986) (―Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen 
everything that these officers observed.‖). 
 47. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 48. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971); see also Lopez v. United States, 373 
U.S. 427, 440 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757–58 (1952). 
 49. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 50. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).  
 51. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
 52. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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applied in differing factual circumstances . . . [that make] it difficult for 
the policeman to discern the scope of his authority.‖53 The twin goals of 
protecting privacy and regulating police sometimes complement each 
other, but at other times operate in significant tension. How the Supreme 
Court addresses this tension shapes the everyday experience of 
constitutional values. 
A. Protecting Privacy 
Whether police officers are entitled to look in a particular place, listen 
to a particular conversation, or intrude generally into the affairs of others 
depends upon what activities and places the Court considers private. The 
accepted narrative of how privacy came to dominate Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence begins with Justice Brandeis‘s dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States,
54
 a case first confronting the constitutionality of using wiretaps to 
eavesdrop on telephone conversations. Although the Court found no 
constitutional violation, Justice Brandeis exhorted: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the 
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that 
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the 
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be 
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
55
 
Rather than focusing on the property interest at stake, Justice Brandeis 
sought to shape a privacy right to be free from unjustified government 
intrusion. Despite Brandeis‘s effort, property interests continued to 
predominate until the Supreme Court confronted another occasion when 
police recorded a telephone conversation.
56
 Modern Fourth Amendment 
doctrine derives from the Court‘s determination in Katz v. United States 
that police may not conduct electronic surveillance of a private telephone 
booth conversation without prior judicial authorization.
57
 The Court 
 
 
 53. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (citations omitted).  
 54. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 55. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 56. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942) (reasoning no Fourth 
Amendment violation because no trespass occurred while securing the listening apparatus); Orin S. 
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–15 (2004) (arguing that property law considerations still dominate Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence).  
 57. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
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declared that ―the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places‖58 and 
resolved that persons receive Fourth Amendment protection against 
government searches only when they have a ―reasonable expectation of 
privacy.‖59 This standard evolved into a judicial inquiry that balances the 
nature of the government need against the degree of privacy intrusion, 
only if the place where police look remains private. As Katz stated, 
―[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‖60  
If there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, then police do not 
conduct a ―search‖ for constitutional purposes when they engage in 
investigatory inspections. ―Search‖ is not defined by the purposes and 
actions of the police, but by the physical location or the social expectation 
of the targeted object or person. Under the Katz framework, if a person 
publicly exposes an item, then it receives no constitutional protection.
61
 
Telephone numbers conveyed to a service provider,
62
 financial 
transactions relayed through financial institutions,
63
 garbage left on the 
street,
64
 and activities on one‘s property visible to others65 all share a 
common feature: they have been publicly exposed and thus receive no 
privacy protection. Public exposure is not the same as widespread 
exposure. Sharing a conversation or information with a single person 
suffices to vitiate privacy protections.
66
 
Once privacy becomes the focus of Fourth Amendment protection and 
searches are defined in terms of what is withheld from public exposure, 
much of everyday social life occurs outside constitutional purview. What 
is more, the Court instructs that in engaging in everyday social commerce, 
individuals must assume the risk that government officials may freely 
obtain information about them from the people with whom they interact.
67
 
 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 60. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).  
 61. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 62. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
 63. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
 64. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 65. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1987) (concluding that peering into a barn 
outside the curtilage of the house in open fields does not constitute a search); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (―[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that 
the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance.‖).  
 66. Privacy need not extend as far as a person‘s private garden when viewed from above. See 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986); see also Catherine Hancock, Justice Powell’s 
Garden: The Ciraolo Dissent and Fourth Amendment Protection for Curtilage-Home Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 551 (2007) (discussing Justice Powell‘s Ciraolo dissent).  
 67. The Court declared: ―[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of 
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The Supreme Court admonishes: ―It is well settled that when an individual 
reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his 
confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs 
the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that 
information.‖68 Repeatedly, the Court has rejected challenges to 
warrantless police searches of shared spaces and information, so long as 
the person with shared access consents.
69
 A multitude of social and 
commercial transactions involve sharing spaces and information, 
rendering individuals constitutionally unprotected, and police 
constitutionally unconstrained, despite what social expectations people 
may actually have.
70
 In this analytic framework, privacy as secret, or 
undisclosed, is conceptually distinct from what is public, as that which is 
accessible by or known to others. Individual persons most clearly retain 
their privacy when they are alone at home.
71
 When individuals venture out 
into public in the company of others, becoming one amongst other people, 
they must assume the risks that attend the loss of many Fourth 
Amendment protections.  
In contrast to actions that involve sharing information, spaces, and 
possessions with others, activities within the home receive the highest 
protection.
72
 A warrantless search of a home violates the Constitution, at 
 
 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities.‖ Smith, 442 
U.S. at 744 (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)). Chief Justice Roberts 
describes this third-party doctrine this way: ―The common thread in our decisions upholding searches 
conducted pursuant to third-party consent is an understanding that a person ‗assume[s] the risk‘ that 
those who have access to and control over his shared property might consent to a search.‖ Georgia v. 
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 134 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 
U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).  
 68. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (holding that officers need only 
―show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority 
over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected‖); Frazier v. 
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (upholding search of a duffel bag pursuant to consent by a third 
party).  
 70. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE 
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 108 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court is misguided in equating 
―Fourth Amendment privacy with the assumption-of-risk and public-exposure concepts‖).  
 71. Chief Justice Roberts articulated the very narrow conception of privacy at work in the 
assumption-of-risk rationale: ―To the extent a person wants to ensure that his possessions will be 
subject to a consent search only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over 
which others do not share access and control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.‖ 
Randolph, 547 U.S. at 135 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 72. The Court has emphatically declared the central importance of privacy in the home. See 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (―We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws ‗a 
firm line at the entrance to the house.‘ That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright.‖ 
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (―The Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual‘s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy 
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least with regard to the homeowner.
73
 Such searches are forbidden because 
the intimate details of home life form the paradigm of privacy—a space 
that personally excludes its inhabitants from public view and politically 
creates a limit to the exercise of state authority.
74
 As the Court has noted, 
the ―physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed.‖75 
Even in the home, privacy does not create an absolute barrier to police 
intrusion. Activities shared with other people, even when in the home, 
may receive less or even no protection.
76
 Persons who unwittingly invite 
undercover agents into the home have no expectation of privacy,
77
 nor do 
temporary houseguests lacking a sufficient social connection to the host, 
even when the homeowner‘s Fourth Amendment rights are violated.78 
Nonetheless, the Court maintains the position that the Constitution ―draws 
. . . [a] firm but also bright‖79 line at the threshold of the home.80 As 
Stephanie Stern argues, this exclusive focus on the home often leads the 
 
 
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual‘s 
home.‖).  
 73. Speaking of Fourth Amendment rights, the Court has declared that ―[a]t the very core stands 
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental 
intrusion.‖ Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Stephanie M. Stern, The 
Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912–13 
(2010). But see Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998) (holding that a temporary occupant of 
another‘s home has no expectation of privacy against government intrusions).  
 74. Politically speaking, the Court has recognized ―the ancient adage that a man‘s house is his 
castle‖ and that ―‗[t]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.‘‖ 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quotation omitted). Regarding the Court‘s 
recognition of the personal and intimate nature of privacy in the home, see Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a 
Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485 (2009).  
 75. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).  
 76. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90–91 (holding that a temporary social guest without sufficient social 
attachment to the homeowner has no expectation of privacy).  
 77. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (―But when . . . the home is converted 
into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, 
that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if‖ carried out in public.). 
 78. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90–91. But see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (holding 
that an overnight guest ―has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his host‘s home‖).  
 79. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 
716 (1984) (―Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from public view would 
present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth 
Amendment oversight.‖).  
 80. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (stressing ―the overriding respect for the 
sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic‖). The 
home plays an important Fourth Amendment role. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (distinguishing enhanced 
surveillance in Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) because it did not intrude on the 
―sanctity of the home‖); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609–10 (1999) (emphasizing English roots 
for protecting the sanctity of the home); Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 (―[P]hysical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed . . . .‖).  
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Court to ignore the privacy of intimate associations in other places.
81
 
Focusing privacy exclusively on the home is also inconsistent with the 
Court‘s claim in Katz v. United States that ―the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.‖82  
After Katz, privacy became an analytic focus for Fourth Amendment 
doctrine. As the Court made clear: ―The purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment is to prevent unreasonable governmental intrusions into the 
privacy of one‘s person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned 
is the unjustified governmental invasion of these areas of an individual's 
life.‖83 Yet, privacy is not the only, nor at times the primary, doctrinal 
focus. In order to uncover the latent protections for the security and liberty 
provided by the Fourth Amendment, it is instructive to see how the Court 
constructs a different narrative of the Fourth Amendment. In order to 
protect privacy, the Supreme Court must fashion conduct rules to regulate 
police behavior.
84
 When discussing conduct rules applicable to police 
practice, the Court‘s principal narrative shifts. Choice of narrative drives 
substantive outcomes, as the contrast between Arizona v. Gant
85
 and 
Herring v. United States
86
 illustrates. Because of the factual complexity 
and multiplicity of situations that police officers face, the Court has often 
been hesitant to impede police investigations with rigorous restraints, 
opting at times for rules easily administered by police, though offering less 
protection for privacy.
87
 
B. Regulating Police  
The Fourth Amendment is a blunt instrument to wield when regulating 
complex social situations and police practices.
88
 As constitutional rules of 
 
 
 81. See Stern, supra note 73, at 908.  
 82. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 83. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974). 
 84. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (1984) (arguing that often there is a difference between 
the conduct rules directed at specific actors and the rules of decision a court applies). 
 85. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
 86. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 87. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982) (―[N]ice distinctions between . . . 
glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must 
give way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.‖ (footnote 
omitted)). 
 88. See Jon B. Gould & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assessing Police Behavior 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL‘Y 315, 331 (2004) (finding that thirty 
percent of searches in empirical study of medium-sized city were unconstitutional); Bernard E. 
Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL‘Y 363, 375 (2004) (―We decide what to criminalize and enforce, and in the very process, we allow 
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criminal procedure have become more refined, and simultaneously 
contested, judges and scholars have focused more attention on how the 
Fourth Amendment might regulate police most effectively. For example, 
one scholar employs four models for explaining Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, because ―[t]he Supreme Court has not and cannot adopt a single 
test for when an expectation is ‗reasonable‘ because no one test effectively 
and consistently distinguishes the more troublesome police practices that 
require Fourth Amendment scrutiny from the less troublesome practices 
that do not.‖89 Institutionally, Supreme Court doctrine must guide not only 
police practice, but also lower courts who must assess a large number of 
constitutional challenges to particular instances of police investigatory 
conduct.
90
 Aware of this fact, the Supreme Court in New York v. Belton 
made clear that ―‗Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by 
the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to regulate the police in their 
day-to-day activities.‘‖91 Belton‘s subject matter, as well as the subsequent 
case history, illustrates both the complexity and the regulatory purpose of 
search and seizure doctrine. 
1. From Belton to Gant 
Belton involved routine enforcement of traffic speed limits.
92
 A New 
York state police officer stopped a car for speeding, smelled marijuana, 
made an arrest, and searched the car incident to arrest. During the search 
of the car interior, the trooper found a jacket belonging to a passenger and, 
 
 
other forms of deviance to flourish. Unconstitutional police searches are, tragically, but one perfect 
example. . . . [W]e let loose discretionary policing, and we inevitably produce a certain amount—a 
predictable amount—of improper searches . . . .‖).  
 89. Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 
(2007). He further explains that the four models of Fourth Amendment doctrine help the Court ―more 
accurately identify police practices needing regulation.‖ Id. at 526. 
 90. Speaking for two bodies—the police and lower courts—means that Court opinions must 
provide both decision rules to guide courts and conduct rules to guide police. See Dan-Cohen, supra 
note 84, at 627–28. The problem is that these two are not always aligned. The Supreme Court‘s 
standing doctrine holds that an individual can complain only of violations of her Fourth Amendment 
rights, not the violation of another person‘s rights, even when the evidence used against her was 
obtained from the violation of the other person‘s rights. See, e.g., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 
727 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). The problem, as Carol Steiker observes, is that 
when ―the police ‗hear‘ the Court‘s decision rules and thus are able to predict the likely legal 
consequences of their unconstitutional behavior, they may see little reason to continue to obey conduct 
rules that are consistently unenforced.‖ Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2543 (1996).  
 91. 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, “Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus 
“Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 141 (1974)). 
 92. 453 U.S. at 455. 
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upon searching through its pockets, found cocaine. Answering in the 
affirmative, the Court considered whether the Fourth Amendment 
permitted police to conduct a warrantless search of the interior of the 
stopped car, including any containers found in the interior, incident to the 
arrest of an occupant.
93
 The Court relied on precedent articulating the need 
to protect officer safety and the need to protect easily destroyed evidence 
as the central rationales for allowing warrantless searches of vehicles 
incident to arrest.
94
 Citing the need for clear rules, the Court reasoned that 
Fourth Amendment protections ―‗can only be realized if the police are 
acting under a set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to 
reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of 
privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.‘‖95 
Enter the daily complexity. If police can conduct a search of a vehicle 
incident to arrest pursuant to a traffic stop, may the police conduct such a 
search based on an arrest of a recent occupant of a car who is now safely 
ensconced in a police cruiser? In Thornton v. United States, the Court 
decided that the spatial relation of a recent occupant does not determine 
whether police may search a car incident to an arrest.
96
 In the interest of 
providing clear rules, the Court held that if an arrestee is a recent occupant 
of a car, police may search the car. ―The need for a clear rule, readily 
understood by police officers and not depending on differing estimates of 
what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any particular 
moment, justifies‖ such a rule extending the circumstances in which police 
may conduct a warrantless search.
97
  
In its October 2008 term, the Supreme Court reviewed a very similar 
factual situation in Arizona v. Gant.
98
 Tucson police officers arrested 
Rodney Gant for driving with a suspended license, placed him handcuffed 
in the patrol car, and searched his car, finding cocaine in the pockets of a 
jacket strewn on the backseat.
99
 The facts in Thornton were a bit different. 
Marcus Thornton had parked his car and walked away from it when a 
 
 
 93. Id. at 455, 462–63. 
 94. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), the Court reasoned, ―it is reasonable for 
the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might 
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee‘s person in order to prevent its 
concealment or destruction.‖ 
 95. Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, ―Case-By-Case Adjudication” Versus 
“Standardized Procedures”: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 142 (1974)).  
 96. 541 U.S. 615, 622 (2004). 
 97. Id. at 622–23.  
 98. 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).  
 99. Id. at 1715. 
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police officer confronted him, frisked him, and subsequently discovered 
drugs in his front pocket.
100
 The purpose behind searching Thornton‘s car 
was to discover more drug evidence pursuant to his arrest for narcotics 
possession, while in Gant, there was no purpose in trying to discover 
further evidence relating to an arrest for driving with a suspended license. 
The search of Gant‘s vehicle, by contrast, was a general investigatory 
search. Police had no reason to believe they would find contraband or 
weapons. They simply exercised what they believed was an entitlement to 
look. Out of concern for untethering the rationale from the rule, the Court 
held that only when a recent occupant is unsecured within reaching 
distance of the vehicle may the police search a vehicle incident to an 
arrest.
101
 This circumstance does not exist when an arrestee is securely 
handcuffed in a patrol vehicle. Attempting to work within the Belton-
Thornton doctrinal framework, Justice Stevens avoided overruling 
Thornton, concluding that ―[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a 
recent occupant‘s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of 
the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to 
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.‖102 In the 
process of making a more refined determination of when vehicles may be 
searched incident to the arrest of recent occupants, Justice Stevens‘s 
majority opinion rejected the idea that the interest in providing police with 
a bright-line rule required a different result.
103
 Here is where a major shift 
in the focus on regulating police occurred.  
In the Belton-Thornton world, privacy scarcely makes an appearance. 
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist‘s majority opinion in Thornton fails to mention 
privacy at all, focused as it was on crafting a bright-line rule to guide 
police practice.
104
 By contrast, Justice Stevens‘s opinion in Gant pivots on 
its rejection of the priority of police regulation. Privacy reappears as a 
central value because the Court recognizes that persons retain a privacy 
interest when they are in their vehicles that extends to their possessions, 
such as purses and briefcases.
105
 Justice Stevens notes that ―[a] rule that 
gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an individual is 
 
 
 100. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 617–18.  
 101. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. In order to reconcile the opinion with Thornton, the Court 
further determined that ―circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a 
lawful arrest when it is ‗reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found 
in the vehicle.‘‖ Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632).  
 102. Id. at 1723.  
 103. See id. at 1720–21. 
 104. 541 U.S. at 617–24.  
 105. See id.  
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caught committing a traffic offense‖106 would constitute a serious threat to 
privacy. Responding to the argument that the state has an overriding 
interest in a bright-line rule, the majority opinion cautions that ―the State 
seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake.‖107 Expanding police 
authority to search cars during traffic stops ―implicates the central concern 
underlying the Fourth Amendment—the concern about giving police 
officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person‘s private 
effects.‖108 Although there are other occasions and justifications 
authorizing warrantless police searches of vehicles, the Court refused to 
construct a broad rule that would ―provide a police entitlement‖ to intrude 
further on individual privacy.
109
 In so doing, Gant makes apparent the 
significant tension that exists between the doctrine‘s regulatory purposes 
and its privacy principles. 
Often, the bright-line regulatory rule encourages more deference to 
police discretion in conducting warrantless searches and seizures.
110
 By 
contrast, privacy considerations always place hurdles in the way of 
discretionary investigatory efforts. There is no intrinsic reason why bright-
line rules need be less privacy protecting. When the Court focuses on 
regulating police practice, however, the tendency is to attend more closely 
to police needs rather than privacy protections. As in Gant, a rule flowing 
from a privacy-protecting rationale may require a more nuanced and fact-
specific application than a bright-line rule allowing police to search a 
vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. From the perspective of 
police regulation, such fact-specific considerations are an anathema, 
because they make ―it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of 
his authority.‖111 Of course, some bright-line rules are also privacy-
protecting, such as the bright line drawn around the privacy of the 
home.
112
 But even there, the desire to provide for law enforcement needs 
 
 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. The Court also recognized that ―Belton creates the risk ‗that police will make custodial 
arrests which they otherwise would not make as a cover for a search which the Fourth Amendment 
otherwise prohibits.‘‖ Id. at 1720 n.5 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.1(c) 
(4th ed. 2004)).  
 109. Id. at 1721.  
 110. For example, concluding that there is no expectation of privacy in open fields, even if a land 
owner had fenced and posted her property, the Court argued that ―[t]his Court repeatedly has 
acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case 
definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances‖ that make 
―it difficult for the policeman to discern the scope of his authority.‖ Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170, 181 (1984) (citations omitted). 
 111. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181. 
 112. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (―The Fourth Amendment protects the 
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creates pressure for reasonable exceptions to the rule.
113
 As a practical 
matter, therefore, whether a court has in view regulatory or privacy 
considerations will often determine substantive outcomes and shape 
everyday police-citizen encounters.  
This difference is evident in Justice Alito‘s Gant dissent.114 Claiming 
that the majority effectively overturned Belton, Justice Alito emphasized 
the fact that ―the rule was adopted for the express purpose of providing a 
test that would be relatively easy for police officers and judges to 
apply.‖115 The majority‘s approach is objectionable because it further 
complicates police procedure during roadside stops, requiring officers ―to 
determine whether there is reason to believe that the vehicle contains 
evidence of the crime of arrest.‖116 When the Court creates a standard such 
as ―within an arrestee‘s reach‖ and ―reasonable to believe‖ to justify 
vehicle searches, it invites more case-by-case determinations, which police 
may be ill suited to make.
117
 From a regulatory standpoint, Justice Alito‘s 
concern is exemplified by the imprecision of similar standards. The Court 
has been unable to precisely define standards like ―reasonable suspicion‖ 
and ―probable cause,‖118 just as lower courts have struggled over a ―reason 
to believe‖ standard in the context of entering a home pursuant to an arrest 
warrant.
119
  
 
 
individual‘s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than 
when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual‘s home . . . .‖). 
 113. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (recognizing exigent circumstances 
exception); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978) (same); see also United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 924 (1984) (recognizing good faith exception to probable cause requirement). Craig 
Bradley notes, ―[t]he Court tries on the one hand to lay down clear rules for the police to follow in 
every situation while also trying to respond flexibly, or ‗reasonably,‘ to each case because a hard-line 
approach would lead to exclusion of evidence.‖ Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1470 (1985).  
 114. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1726–30 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 1729. Justice Alito further emphasized the Belton purpose as ―‗essential to guide police 
officers‘‖ and lamented the fact that ―[t]his ‗bright-line rule‘ has now been interred.‖ Id. at 1727 
(quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)). 
 116. Id. at 1729.  
 117. Id.  
 118. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (―Articulating precisely what ‗reasonable 
suspicion‘ and ‗probable cause‘ mean is not possible. They are commonsense, nontechnical 
conceptions that deal with ‗‗the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.‘‘‖ (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 
(1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)))). 
 119. In Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the Court admonished that police in possession 
of an arrest warrant backed by probable cause had ―limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the 
suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.‖ Id. at 603. Lower courts are split 
over whether ―reason to believe‖ amounts to probable cause itself or a lower standard akin to 
―reasonable suspicion.‖ Compare United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(concluding that ―reason to believe‖ is less than probable cause), with United States v. Gorman, 314 
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Keeping the focus on police practice, Justice Alito notes that police 
have been trained to follow the Belton rule for more than twenty-five 
years.
120
 He further observes that under the Gant rule, police would have a 
perverse incentive to keep an arrestee unsecured near the vehicle in order 
to justify conducting a search incident to arrest.
121
 This incentive exists 
because police have been trained to conduct these searches pursuant to 
roadside arrests. Moreover, an unrestricted privilege to conduct searches 
incident to arrest provides a low-cost alternative to the investigative effort 
necessary to secure a warrant, providing further incentive to conduct these 
searches. Without particularized suspicion, police may rummage through 
the passenger compartment of a vehicle and a person‘s possessions, 
hoping to find something inculpatory. Because the Court‘s conduct rules 
under Belton did not prohibit the practice, and because police have strong 
incentives to take advantage of the low-cost investigatory technique, 
Justice Alito is no doubt correct in claiming that police have relied on the 
prior legal rule.
122
 What Justice Alito fails to recognize is that factors such 
as reliance tell us nothing about the constitutional status of the underlying 
practice. For that, the Court ordinarily looks to the relevant privacy 
interests. 
An individual‘s interest in privacy does not even merit mention in 
Justice Alito‘s dissent.123 In response to Justice Alito‘s emphasis on police 
reliance interests, Justice Stevens observes that ―[c]ountless individuals 
guilty of nothing more serious than a traffic violation have had their 
constitutional right to the security of their private effects violated as a 
result‖124 of law enforcement‘s widespread practice of conducting searches 
of recent vehicle occupants incident to arrest. Not only does Justice 
Stevens have in view the privacy implications of police practice in the case 
before the Court, but also the implications for privacy for others who will 
never bring a case before a judge. ―Countless individuals‖ risk exposure to 
constitutional violations when the Court is focused primarily on easily 
administrable police regulations.  
Gant illustrates how the choice to prioritize either regulating police 
conduct or protecting privacy interests determines substantive 
constitutional outcomes. By focusing on regulating police conduct, the 
 
 
F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding that ―reason to believe‖ is equivalent to probable cause).  
 120. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1728 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 121. See id. at 1730.  
 122. Id. at 1728–29. 
 123. See id. at 1726–32.  
 124. Id. at 1722–23 (majority opinion).  
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dissent would have legitimized an intrusive police practice. By focusing 
instead on protecting individual privacy interests, the majority invalidated 
a successful police search as unlawful, in the process making ―clear that 
[if] a practice is unlawful, individuals‘ interest in its discontinuance clearly 
outweighs any law enforcement ‗entitlement‘ to its persistence.‖125 
Because the Chimel reasons—officer safety and preservation of 
evidence—did not apply, the police reliance on a convenient practice was 
insufficient to justify the privacy intrusion.
126
 Although successful in this 
case, privacy does not always prevail when the two Fourth Amendment 
purposes conflict. 
These twin purposes are sometimes mediated by the textually 
determined standard of reasonableness, adding further occasions to 
consider regulatory interests.
127
 Supreme Court majorities have sometimes 
examined the constitutionality of a particular search or seizure by 
balancing ―on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an 
individual‘s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for 
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.‖128 Under such a 
balancing approach, what is reasonable will depend, however, on how a 
court characterizes the interaction between the citizen and police. 
―Reasonableness‖ is not an independent inquiry. To conclude that a search 
is ―reasonable,‖ courts must make prior judgments about the importance of 
a particular police practice or a particular privacy interest. When 
conducting a balancing inquiry, if the citizen is construed to have a 
diminished expectation of privacy, then the needs of effective law 
enforcement will almost always predominate.
129
  
 
 
 125. Id. at 1723 (citation omitted).  
 126. See id. at 1719. 
 127. By adding reasonableness to the inquiry, the Court adds another layer of indeterminacy that 
is then used as a justification for imposing clear and simple rules for police to follow. As the Court 
admits, ―there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to 
search against the invasion which the search entails.‖ Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–
37 (1967). Nonetheless the Court has frequently stated that ―the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is ‗reasonableness.‘‖ Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (quoting Flippo v. 
West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 
118 (2001) (―The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .‖).  
 128. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 
326, 331 (2001) (―Consequently, rather than employing a per se rule of unreasonableness, the Court 
must balance the privacy-related and law enforcement–related concerns to determine if the intrusion 
here was reasonable.‖).  
 129. See Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between 
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1768 (1994) (―Once the reasonableness inquiry is 
undertaken, though, the government‘s judgment that the particular intrusion is needed because of 
policy concerns becomes an integral part of the Fourth Amendment analysis.‖).  
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For example, to decide whether police officers, who have probable 
cause to believe contraband is in an automobile during a traffic stop, may 
search a passenger‘s belongings, the Court in Wyoming v. Houghton 
exercised a balancing test.
130
 First, because they are publicly visible and 
subject to extensive traffic regulation, vehicle occupants have a reduced 
expectation of privacy.
131
 Second, the Court reasoned that searches of 
personal property do not implicate personal dignity in the manner that 
bodily searches do.
132
 By contrast, ―[e]ffective law enforcement would be 
appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger‘s personal 
belongings when there is reason to believe contraband or evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing is hidden in the car.‖133 The need to provide ―‗‗clear 
and unequivocal‘ guidelines to the law enforcement profession‘‖ had 
already produced a rule allowing warrantless searches of vehicles and any 
containers found therein when officers have probable cause to believe 
contraband is present.
134
 Citing the ready mobility of cars
135
 and the 
likelihood of passengers sharing a common enterprise with the driver, the 
Court refused to recognize a ―passenger‘s property‖ exception to 
warrantless vehicle searches.
136
 Claiming that reasonableness requires 
consideration of practical realities, the Court sought to avoid creating 
incentives for drivers to hide contraband in passengers‘ personal 
containers and to avoid producing a feared ―bog of litigation.‖137 In this 
analysis, considerations of effective police enforcement, as well as the 
practical realities of judicial administration, predominate over any 
recognized privacy interests. A balancing inquiry into reasonableness 
allows the Court to consider an ever-widening set of practical and 
contextual issues, often framed in terms of law enforcement needs. From 
the perspective of claimed state necessity, privacy considerations must be 
 
 
 130. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303–06.  
 131. See id. at 303. 
 132. See id.; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (―We are not convinced that a 
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he 
would otherwise be entitled.‖). 
 133. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304.  
 134. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 
146, 151 (1990) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988))). Prior cases, such as United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), and United States v. 
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), had provided different rules applicable to warrantless searches of vehicles 
and containers, which the Court characterized as having ―confused courts and police officers and 
impeded effective law enforcement.‖ Acevado, 500 U.S. at 576.  
 135. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (creating an ―automobile exception‖ to the 
warrant requirement based in part on the ready mobility of cars).  
 136. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304–05. 
 137. See id. at 305.  
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particularly weighty to prevail. Whether it is the need of law enforcement 
to search cars and containers,
138
 to conduct temporary stops,
139
 to operate 
sobriety checkpoints,
140
 or to administer searches of student belongings,
141
 
a reasonableness inquiry often focuses on official necessity, not on 
personal privacy.  
When privacy does make a robust appearance, as it does in Justice 
Stevens‘s dissent in Houghton,142 the potential results are very different. 
Arguing that ―the State‘s legitimate interest in effective law enforcement 
does not outweigh the privacy concerns at issue,‖ Justice Stevens 
contested the majority‘s reasons for claiming ostensible simplicity in their 
chosen rule.
143
 He would have required individualized suspicion of 
passengers before the police could search their possessions, thereby 
creating a rule every bit as easily administered as the majority‘s rule, but 
one that ―simply protects more privacy.‖144 Thus, practical conclusions 
about ease of administration or the simplicity of a bright-line rule may 
often depend on background assumptions about what matters most. Even 
for those who argue that the Fourth Amendment inquiry should be focused 
on reasonableness, such as Akhil Amar or Justice Scalia,
145
 we still need 
an account of reasonableness in relation to particular values. 
Reasonableness is an incomplete evaluative standard. What is reasonable 
depends on a context that includes the values, purposes, and practices to 
which it applies. The two primary purposes—regulating police and 
protecting privacy—guide the reasonableness inquiry, but do not 
themselves instruct courts as to which purpose should take priority. For 
guidance, we need further inquiry into available constitutional values, 
purposes, and meanings. 
Because the Court has two overriding purposes in directing its view of 
a particular case, the addition of a reasonableness balancing inquiry does 
nothing to resolve the tension. If a Court majority sees promotion of 
effective law enforcement as a primary purpose, a balancing inquiry will 
 
 
 138. See id. at 303–06. 
 139. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 140. See Mich. Dep‘t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).  
 141. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).  
 142. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 309–13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 143. Id. at 311.  
 144. Id. at 312.  
 145. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (―In my view, 
the path out of this confusion should be sought by returning to the first principle that the 
‗reasonableness‘ requirement of the Fourth Amendment affords the protection that the common law 
afforded.‖); AMAR, supra note 26, at 39 (―By focusing on constitutional reasonableness, we restore the 
Fourth to its rightful place.‖).  
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only reflect that view. The same exists for a view focused on protecting 
privacy.
146
 If anything, a reasonableness inquiry risks pushing even further 
into the background the choice between Fourth Amendment purposes, 
obscuring prior determinations of relative value through the metaphor of 
balancing. What kinds of considerations might bring this tension into 
focus? Should one of these purposes take priority over the other?  
2. The New Exclusion in Herring 
Constitutional shift along the fault line between these dueling Fourth 
Amendment purposes is evident in the Court‘s opinion in Herring v. 
United States.
147
 At stake was whether the exclusionary rule should apply 
to a search authorized by an outstanding arrest warrant that had been 
withdrawn but had negligently remained ―active‖ in a computer 
database.
148
 From the outset, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, framed the issue from the perspective of what the officer 
―reasonably believes.‖149 Fourth Amendment violations do not always 
justify exclusion of evidence.
150
 ―Instead, the question turns on the 
culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful 
police conduct.‖151 In deciding this question, the majority repeatedly 
asserted that the exclusionary rule was judicially created in order to deter 
constitutional violations by the police.
152
 Moreover, ―the benefits of 
deterrence must outweigh the costs,‖ because the Court claims that small 
or marginal deterrence cannot justify the costs of letting lawbreakers go 
free.
153
 Because ―[t]he exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police‖154 
misconduct, according to the majority, only ―deliberate, reckless, or 
grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic 
 
 
 146. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).  
 147. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009). 
 148. See id. at 698. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911–12 (1984) (applying ―good-faith‖ 
exception to the exclusionary rule).  
 151. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.  
 152. For example, the Court writes: ―We have stated that this judicially created rule is ‗designed 
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect,‘‖ id. at 699 (quoting 
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)), and that ―we have focused on the efficacy of the 
rule in deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future.‖ Id. at 700 (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
347–55); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 352–53 (1987) (―[T]o the extent that application of 
the exclusionary rule could provide some incremental deterrent, that possible benefit must be weighed 
against [its] ‗substantial social costs‘ . . . .‖ (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 907)).  
 153. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700–01. 
 154. Id. at 701.  
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negligen[ce],‖ will justify its application.155 To apply the exclusionary 
rule, ―police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can 
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable‖ to justify the cost to the 
criminal justice system.
156
 Otherwise, the majority concludes, there is no 
reason the criminal should ―go free because the constable has 
blundered.‖157  
With this analysis, regulation of law enforcement practices rests on two 
layers of balancing. First, to determine whether a constitutional violation 
occurred, the needs of effective law enforcement are balanced against the 
privacy interests at stake. Second, when a constitutional violation has 
occurred, the deterrent effect of law enforcement is further weighed 
against the social cost of excluding reliable evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing. During the second-order balancing inquiry, the Court does 
not consider the social cost of losing trust in government, the social cost to 
innocent victims, or the social cost of having the judicial system confer its 
imprimatur on lawless conduct by police. What is more, in weighing 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule, a two-prong inquiry requires both 
deliberate and culpable police conduct. Such focus augurs further 
constitutional shift, as the Court considers on a case-by-case basis whether 
a substantial deterrent effect exists, justifying suppression of evidence to 
remedy future violations. By focusing on how well a present application of 
exclusion works to regulate future police conduct, the actual violation of 
Bennie Dean Herring‘s Fourth Amendment privacy right scarcely comes 
into view.  
Not only does the actual constitutional violation in Herring come into 
view for Justice Ginsburg writing in dissent, but also the ―innocent 
persons ‗wrongfully arrested based on erroneous information [carelessly 
maintained] in a computer data base.‘‖158 Where the majority focused on 
deterring future reckless police misconduct, the dissent focused on future 
constitutional violations that innocent persons will suffer.
159
 The harm that 
results from erroneous record keeping is not insignificant, even if one 
 
 
 155. Id. at 702.  
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 704 (quoting People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) and applying Justice 
Cardozo‘s quip). The Court also appealed to Judge Henry Friendly‘s rationale for the exclusionary 
rule. See id. at 702; Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. 
L. REV. 929, 951 (1965) (―The sole reason for exclusion is that experience has demonstrated this to be 
the only effective method for deterring the police from violating the Constitution.‖).  
 158. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 705 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 
22 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 159. See id. at 705–10. 
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focuses only on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. As Justice 
Ginsburg observes, ―‗[t]he offense to the dignity of the citizen who is 
arrested, handcuffed, and searched on a public street simply because some 
bureaucrat has failed to maintain an accurate computer data base‘ is 
evocative of the use of general warrants that so outraged the authors of our 
Bill of Rights.‖160 This dignitary offense is not one easily remedied ex post 
by the innocent victim, whose likely incentive is to forego further hassle 
by choosing not to pursue an illusory civil remedy for which qualified 
immunity will likely apply.
161
 Rather, it is precisely the kind of 
constitutional offense that will go unremedied, providing little incentive 
for police to maintain accurate records. Given how much information is 
increasingly accessible about individuals through national and local 
databases, the risk of harm is not insignificant and ―raise[s] grave concerns 
for individual liberty.‖162 These criticisms confront the majority‘s 
assessment of when the deterrent effects of exclusion are sufficiently 
substantial. If the disagreement went no further, the majority and dissent 
would simply differ in their judgments about the substantial effects of 
exclusion.  
Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent also addresses more fundamental issues by 
contesting the majority‘s vision of the Fourth Amendment.163 Much more 
than a technical regulatory scheme to govern police conduct, Justice 
Ginsburg suggests that the Fourth Amendment serves fundamental 
political purposes. ―[T]he Amendment ‗is a constraint on the power of the 
sovereign, not merely on some of its agents.‘‖164 Framed as a constraint on 
sovereign power, the Fourth Amendment has a broader political purpose 
that regulating police and protecting individual privacy help achieve. Even 
relatively minor constitutional violations, as Chief Justice Roberts might 
describe them, implicate important relations between state and citizen and 
occur within proper constraints on the power of governing officials.  
Neither the majority nor the dissent focuses on privacy. Instead, the 
dissent‘s conception of the Fourth Amendment is focused on protecting 
 
 
 160. Id. at 709 (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 161. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The difficulty overcoming qualified 
immunity is further exemplified in an opinion decided the same term as Herring. See Pearson v. 
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).  
 162. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 163. See id. at 705–10. 
 164. Id. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). Justice Ginsburg also cites Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The 
Origins, Development, and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1365 (1983). Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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individual liberty and citizen dignity.
165
 Dignitary harms result from 
unjustified physical contact by state agents. They are experienced by 
particular persons and shape how persons view their own security and how 
they fulfill their promise of liberty. Extending beyond individual acts of 
particular police officers, Fourth Amendment violations shape how 
individual persons experience their everyday relations to the institutions of 
government. Because individuals may rarely have direct interactions with 
state officials, they may suffer additional harms when subjected to an 
illegal search. These interactions can influence how particular individuals 
view the trustworthiness of state officials and can shape their overall view 
of governing institutions and authority. Unremedied Fourth Amendment 
violations can also impact an individual‘s sense of political belonging 
within a community. If constitutional protections fail to apply to them, 
then persons may legitimately question their standing within the political 
community. The limitation on searches and seizures, as a ―right of the 
people,‖ does more than regulate the conduct of particular officers. It 
establishes a political relation between ―the People‖ and the institutions 
that exercise sovereign power in their name.
166
  
What is significant about the dissent‘s analysis is that it evokes the 
larger Fourth Amendment purpose of protecting both liberty and dignity. 
In doing so, Justice Ginsburg recognizes the other objectives the 
exclusionary rule serves: avoiding loss of judicial integrity through the 
taint of lawlessness, ensuring that government does not profit from its own 
lawlessness, and promoting trust in government.
167
 These are not 
thematically isolated considerations. Nor do they deny that deterring 
lawless conduct by individual police officers is an important 
consideration. Regulating police behavior, however, is not an objective 
isolated from a more fundamental need ―‗to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by 
removing the incentive to disregard it.‘‖168 Constitutional respect is not 
merely a problem of individual state agents, but is a goal addressed to the 
exercise of sovereign power itself. Only sovereign power that respects ―the 
People‖ and adheres to constitutional constraints has political legitimacy. 
If institutions exercising governing power retain unchecked incentives to 
 
 
 165. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 166. See infra notes 286–317 and accompanying text.  
 167. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 168. Id. (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).  
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violate constitutional guarantees, then those institutions lose political 
legitimacy and produce political cynicism.
169
  
C. A Political Purpose? 
By contrast to the dissent‘s broader view in Herring, the liberty-
protecting Fourth Amendment does not appear in the majority‘s 
analysis.
170
 Nor does the availability of any alternative remedy for the 
admitted constitutional violation in this case.
171
 If letting a known 
lawbreaker go free is a cost to society, then so too is failing to remedy a 
constitutional violation, though that fact goes unacknowledged. 
Reconstructing precedent, Chief Justice Roberts based his analysis on the 
claim that past cases establish the fact that ―the exclusionary rule is not an 
individual right and applies only where it ‗‗results in appreciable 
deterrence.‘‘‖172 To explain why it only applies where appreciable 
deterrence results, Chief Justice Roberts claims that the rule ―was crafted 
to curb police . . . misconduct.‖173 Moreover, that conduct must be 
―sufficiently culpable‖ to justify the cost to the justice system.174 Chief 
 
 
 169. These thoughts are reflected in Justice Brandeis‘s powerful dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States: ―In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe 
the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy.‖ 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 170. See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698–704. 
 171. See id. When the Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule in other contexts, such as 
violations of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against ―no-knock‖ entries, it has referenced the 
possibility of other remedies. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (refusing to apply 
exclusionary rule to no-knock entry); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment requires police to knock and announce their presence before entering a premises to 
execute a warrant). 
 172. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984) (quoting 
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976))). Contrast Herring‘s emphasis on deterrence with the 
Court‘s emphasis that ―[a] ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we recognize, has the 
necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence, while an application of the 
exclusionary rule withholds the constitutional imprimatur.‖ Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). 
Other scholars have noted the reconstruction of exclusionary doctrine at work in cases leading up to 
Herring, such as Hudson v. Michigan. See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies & Anna B. Scanlon, Katz in the Age 
of Hudson v. Michigan: Some Thoughts on “Suppression as a Last Resort,” 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1035, 1043 (2008); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
567, 568 (2008) (―The Court was right to suggest that policing has changed a lot since the 1960s. 
Those changes may in fact justify significant shifts in how we think about and regulate law 
enforcement. But they have not yet rendered the exclusionary rule superfluous, nor are they likely to 
do so anytime soon.‖).  
 173. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701.  
 174. Id. at 702.  
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Justice Roberts offers no principle to explain why the exclusionary rule 
must be limited only to providing ―substantial deterrence‖ for police 
misconduct.
175
 No doubt, deterring substantial police misconduct is an 
important purpose of much Fourth Amendment doctrine, but it does not 
follow that the remedies for constitutional violations must be limited to 
that purpose.
176
 Since the exclusionary rule may be the only effective 
remedy to Fourth Amendment violations,
177
 what is needed is not a 
statement that past cases have emphasized the deterrent effects of the rule, 
but a reason why the Court should limit application of the rule to this 
purpose alone. Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts does not explain why ―the 
benefits of deterrence must outweigh the costs.‖178 If police violate the 
Constitution, why must a court engage in cost-benefit analysis at all?
179
 
What makes the Fourth Amendment so different in this respect from the 
First Amendment, under which the Court does not weigh the cost and 
benefits of content-based censorship? These are difficult questions the 
majority‘s analysis fails to address. 
One consequence of the new doctrinal emphasis is that because the 
police officer‘s subjective state of mind was insufficiently culpable, the 
harm from a constitutional violation must go without a remedy, for society 
and for individuals like Mr. Herring. The officer did not consciously 
 
 
 175. See id. at 704. Others have offered similar criticisms. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Smell 
of Herring: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Latest Assault on the Exclusionary Rule, 99 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 757, 759 (2009) (―The holding in Herring finds little support in the Chief Justice‘s 
opinion for the majority, which . . . is totally unconvincing and in many respects irrelevant and 
disingenuous.‖).  
 176. Limited to ―substantial deterrence,‖ the remedy becomes an increasingly imperfect 
implementation of accepted constitutional meaning. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional 
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655 (2005) 
(arguing that ―the rules courts apply in deciding constitutional cases do not necessarily reflect the 
underlying meaning of the Constitution.‖).  
 177. Or, it may be more accurate to say, the worst remedy except for all the others. Its 
effectiveness has been questioned for some time, but no alternative has yet to emerge victorious. See 
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994) (arguing 
against reliance on exclusion in favor of civil liability); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 
EMORY L.J. 1311, 1315 (1994) (arguing that police perjury occurs because police seek to avoid the 
consequences of the exclusionary rule); Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the 
Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (arguing for monetary remedies under the 
exclusionary rule to apply only in egregious cases). 
 178. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 700.  
 179. One reason is that zero tolerance will raise the cost of policing. Since society derives a great 
benefit from good policing, overregulating police practice may generate less optimal amounts of 
policing. What is unclear is whether this rationale sufficiently addresses both the distributional costs of 
overpolicing that greater tolerance for constitutional violations produces, particularly among some 
populations, and the broader political costs to the system as a whole. See generally Guido Calabresi, 
The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 111 (2003).  
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intend to violate Mr. Herring‘s constitutional right.180 He merely sought to 
catch a criminal who would now go free absent a judicial weighing of 
costs and benefits. The Court‘s reasoning does not go far enough to 
recognize the greater complexities of what is at stake in narrowing the 
application of the exclusionary rule in this way. For one thing, the 
individual officer is an agent of state power, and ―[t]he right of the people 
to be secure‖181 against state power is not obviously limited to the 
reasonableness or culpability of specific state agents. For another, any 
weighing of the costs and benefits of exclusion will only be as accurate as 
the inputs measured. If we are to have a true weighing of the costs and 
benefits of exclusion, courts must take a broader view than the majority 
did in Herring. Perhaps the disagreement between the majority and dissent 
over the proper incentives to avoid database error is an empirical one. The 
majority discounts the likelihood of purposeful neglect, and the dissent 
raises the specter of the indignities of innocents from poorly maintained 
electronic information. But more fundamentally, the majority has no 
response to the claims that negligent record keeping threatens individual 
liberty and that failure to exclude evidence risks undermining trust in 
government. These costs are broader in scope and speak to the Fourth 
Amendment‘s political purpose, often hidden from view. Focused 
narrowly on regulating police conduct, the majority can only see the 
benefits of deterrence in relation to the costs of nullifying law enforcement 
efforts.
182
 Focused on a broader liberty-protecting conception of the 
Amendment, the dissent perceives other social costs and political harms. 
A literary analogy may be useful here. Chief Justice Roberts has in 
view only the case before him. This police behavior was not intentional 
and outrageous, but negligent and well meaning. He does not appear to 
see, however, the large number of potential negligent, but well meaning, 
constitutional violations for which the exclusionary rule is not an option 
because the person searched had no contraband. In this, Chief Justice 
Roberts is like Josef K. (K.) in an important scene in Franz Kafka‘s novel 
The Trial.
183
 Near the end of the novel, and just prior to meeting a chaplain 
before his inscrutable execution, K. is in a poorly lit cathedral. Shining a 
small light on a large religious painting, he focuses on a guard in one of 
 
 
 180. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 703–04. 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 182. The opinion may also reflect wholesale hostility to the exclusionary rule. See Adam Liptak, 
Supreme Court Edging Closer to Repeal of Evidence Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2009, at A1 
(describing how Chief Justice Roberts ―was hard at work on what he called in a memorandum ‗the 
campaign to amend or abolish the exclusionary rule‘ when working for the Reagan Administration‖).  
 183. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books 1998) (1925).  
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the corners. He contemplates the soldier‘s bearing and expression, nearly 
missing entirely the painting‘s significance. Only after fixating on a 
peripheral element of the painting as a whole does he realize that it depicts 
a scene of Christ‘s entombment.184 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts‘s 
judicial minimalism focuses only on the actions of one officer in one 
county relying on one occasion of erroneous data.
185
 The exclusionary rule 
should not apply here because its effect is so local and small that there is 
little police misconduct to deter, Chief Justice Roberts reasons.
186
 But by 
focusing attention on such a narrow view, he misses the import of the 
overall picture. It is not simply this one occasion, but the larger theme of 
unconstrained police behavior in multifarious local circumstances, which, 
under Chief Justice Roberts‘s approach, may now never risk exclusion.187 
The Fourth Amendment canvas does more than deter particular police 
officers. It constrains the exercise of sovereign power—a theme of 
considerably greater consequence.  
The Fourth Amendment as a constraint on sovereign power is rarely in 
view in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
188
 Instead, as we have seen, the 
Court construes the Fourth Amendment to have twin purposes—protecting 
privacy and regulating police.
189
 Privacy itself sometimes fails to come 
 
 
 184. Id. at 206–07. 
 185. In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts exemplifies a ―minimalist‖ approach to judicial decision 
making. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 3 (1999) (defining minimalism as ―the phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to 
justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided‖). Chief Justice Roberts seems to have 
endorsed such an approach, stating during his confirmation hearings that ―[j]udges are like umpires. 
Umpires don‘t make the rules, they apply them.‖ Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. 
Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to Be Chief Justice of the United 
States). His public statements support such a view as well. See Chief Justice Says His Goal Is More 
Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at A16 (―‗If it is not necessary to decide more to a 
case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide more . . . .‘‖). 
 186. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 703–04 (2009). 
 187. Judicial minimalism is vulnerable to criticism because Supreme Court decisions have 
systemic and broader implications for constitutional culture. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural 
Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2009) (―The Court must . . . make the most 
of the cases it does hear by issuing broad (maximal) decisions that guide the lower courts in the many 
cases that it lacks the capacity to review.‖); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: 
Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 2014 (2005) (―[A]n 
attractive constitutional theory must transcend a narrow and shallow approach to constitutional 
decisionmaking. Judicial minimalism can provide no guidance concerning the foundational questions 
of constitutional theory . . . .‖).  
 188. But see Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (―The Amendment 
is a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents.‖). 
 189. The Court does not always recognize the potential for conflict, stating the two objectives in 
relation to probable cause as two parts to a single inquiry: ―These long-prevailing standards seek to 
safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges 
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into view, however, and law enforcement regulations are often as much 
about facilitating law enforcement practices as they are about limiting 
them. This latter orientation is discordant with a declaration of 
fundamental rights against state practice. Imagine orienting First 
Amendment jurisprudence toward providing clear rules and bright lines to 
facilitate the state censor. No doubt there are legitimate occasions when 
the state may suppress speech
190
 and others when there is pressure for the 
state to regulate,
191
 but the First Amendment‘s purpose is never articulated 
as providing rules to guide state regulation of speech.
192
 To do so would 
turn free speech values on their head.  
To think that the Fourth Amendment‘s purpose is to create a doctrinal 
opportunity to manage modern police practices is to think that the First 
Amendment creates the doctrinal framework for facilitating the state 
censor. No First Amendment doctrine is written as if the Court has a 
special obligation to create bright-line rules for the censorship of speech. 
Congress attempted to regulate internet communications it deemed 
―patently offensive‖ through the Communications Decency Act of 1996,193 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act,
194
 and the Child Online Protection 
Act,
195
 but in holding that each violated the First Amendment, the Court 
did not focus on the need to provide clear rules to facilitate Congress‘s 
censorship of the internet.
196
 Other than making clear that child 
pornography falls outside the protections of the First Amendment,
197
 the 
Court has not claimed a special obligation to clarify how Congress might 
successfully regulate online speech.
198
 By contrast, why does the Supreme 
Court assume an obligation to facilitate regulation of police practice?  
 
 
of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community‘s protection.‖ 
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). 
 190. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969).  
 191. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. 1997), invalidated 
in part by ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 192. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987).  
 193. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2006)), invalidated in part by ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 194. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2000), invalidated in part by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 
U.S. 234 (2002)). 
 195. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 
U.S.C. § 231 (1998), invalidated by Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004)).  
 196. See supra notes 191, 194, 195.  
 197. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756–64 (1982).  
 198. In holding that Congress had failed to employ the least restrictive means to achieve its 
legislative purpose of protecting children, the Court did recognize the existence of other less restrictive 
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Society benefits from successful police practice. Exclusion of evidence 
is only possible when police discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing 
that society wishes to punish. Thus, the constitutional violation only 
becomes an issue because the search was ―successful.‖ The real cost of 
exclusion is borne by society, not the police. Police searches are desirable 
because of the high social value placed on solving crime, punishing 
criminals, and vindicating the truth-seeking function of the courts. As the 
Court explained in Hudson v. Michigan, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to all Fourth Amendment violations: ―What the knock-and-
announce rule has never protected, however, is one's interest in preventing 
the government from seeing or taking evidence described in a warrant.‖199 
The Court assumes that government officials are entitled to find what they 
properly seek, despite any ―attenuated‖ violations in the manner of their 
search. Under the proper circumstances—with possession of a warrant 
backed by probable cause, in exigent circumstances, or on occasions of 
―special needs‖—police may search for or seize evidence of criminal 
activity. To do so promotes a social good.  
Prohibitions on searches, according to this view, are more like First 
Amendment content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.
200
 The 
state may reasonably regulate the time, place, and manner of speech in 
order to foster public order in a content-neutral manner. Such regulations 
promote democratic deliberation, rather than hinder it, by enabling a more 
orderly exchange of ideas in the public sphere. We may seek to avoid loud 
noise, intrusion upon personal space and solitude, public disorder, or 
certain secondary effects of otherwise protected speech. Similarly, on this 
social-good theory of the Fourth Amendment, we enable police practice 
while seeking to avoid warrantless or unreasonable intrusion into homes 
and other private places.
201
 Such regulations provide clear rules to guide 
police practice and, on balance, protect some personal expectations of 
privacy. This analogy—―the People‖ will speak, the police will search—
 
 
regulatory alternatives. See Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 673. But recognizing less restrictive alternative 
means of regulating speech is very different from proposing to provide bright-line rules to assist state 
censorship.  
 199. 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006). Furthermore, ―[t]he interests protected by the knock-and-announce 
requirement are quite different—and do not include the shielding of potential evidence from the 
government‘s eyes.‖ Id. at 593.  
 200. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
 201. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
589 (1980) (―The Fourth Amendment protects the individual‘s privacy in a variety of settings. In none 
is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical 
dimensions of an individual‘s home . . . .‖). 
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means that the deterrence of excluding evidence works only to avoid 
undesirable instances of otherwise desired conduct.  
For the Fourth Amendment to work in full like the First Amendment, 
however, we would have to assume a baseline of government 
noninterference, interrupted only by reasonable content-neutral time, 
place, and manner justifications. That is, we would have to assume that 
police are not entitled to search except for in relatively rare and very 
particular circumstances. But the actual state of current jurisprudence often 
turns the analogy on its head, assuming that a core Fourth Amendment 
value is the facilitation of government searches, as if the core First 
Amendment value were the facilitation of state censorship.
202
 In order to 
reconcile First Amendment jurisprudence with the Fourth Amendment‘s 
focus, we would have to assume the state censor will often interfere with 
private speech. By contrast, to reconcile the Fourth Amendment with the 
First Amendment, we would assume foremost that searches should not 
occur unless specifically authorized and that ―the People‖ should 
otherwise be secure from government intrusion in their persons and 
homes. These assumptions are not outside the Fourth Amendment‘s 
purview. A requirement of a judicially authorized warrant backed by 
probable cause, or a requirement of reasonable suspicion, denote an 
intention to limit the availability of police searches.
203
 Here is where the 
different Fourth Amendment narratives produce real differences in 
practice.  
Focusing on the perceived needs of everyday law enforcement, the 
Court has reflected: ―[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law 
enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims 
of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for arrest.‖204 
When an officer has ―reasonable suspicion‖ that a person is armed and 
dangerous, it would ―be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power 
 
 
 202. See, e.g., Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 622–23 (2004) (emphasizing ―[t]he need 
for a clear rule, readily understood by police‖ officers to facilitate effective law enforcement). 
 203. Even these limits do not mean that we do not invite widespread violations. See, e.g., Ian 
Ayres, Racial Profiling in L.A.: The Numbers Don’t Lie, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at A27 (finding 
―persistent and statistically significant racial disparities in policing that raise grave concerns that 
African Americans and Latinos in Los Angeles are . . . ‗over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched and 
over-arrested.‘‖); see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of Economics, 
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1275, 1282 (2004) (concluding that race-based police profiling is probably not narrowly tailored 
to minimize costs); Harcourt, supra note 88, at 363–64 (examining data of widespread illegal police 
searches and seizures). 
 204. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). 
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to take necessary measures.‖205 So construed, the Fourth Amendment‘s 
―reasonableness‖ language becomes a permissive, rather than a limiting, 
principle of police practice. When the Fourth Amendment‘s purpose is 
construed as facilitating police practice, subtle distinctions motivated by 
suspicion of the state‘s power to search must give way to police interests: 
―When a legitimate search is under way, . . . nice distinctions between . . . 
glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and wrapped packages, in 
the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt and 
efficient completion of the task at hand.‖206 Imagine a similar statement 
regarding regulation of speech: ―When a legitimate censor contemplates 
suppression of speech, nice distinctions between political pamphlets, 
handbills, and soapbox harangues must give way to the interest in the 
prompt and efficient maintenance of public order.‖ No such statement 
would be recognized within modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 
When the Fourth Amendment‘s purpose is construed as protecting 
privacy, by contrast, skepticism about the use of police searches mirrors 
skepticism about state censorship.
207
  
Fourth Amendment protections of personal and interpersonal privacy 
are congruent with First Amendment purposes, whereas rules facilitating 
law enforcement practice are often not.
208
 As the narratives of Gant and 
 
 
 205. Id. What is ―clearly unreasonable‖ has in practice led to widespread racial disparity in the 
distribution of stops and frisks. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. 
C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 43, 63 (2009) (―But Terry means something else in practice and has another face 
that, for many, is less well known. The vast majority of individuals stopped and questioned by the 
police are not engaged in criminal activity and are not carrying weapons or contraband.‖); Tracey 
Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN‘S 
L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998) (noting that Terry functioned as ―a springboard for modern police methods 
that target black men and others for arbitrary and discretionary intrusions‖ (footnote omitted)). See 
generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE, 1789–1868 (2006) (charting the Fourteenth-Amendment relations of African Americans 
to Fourth Amendment law).  
 206. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821 (1982). Other examples in which the Court assumes 
that the search should occur abound. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) 
(―[E]very consideration of orderly police administration benefiting both police and the public points 
toward the appropriateness‖ of suspicionless searches.). 
 207. ―Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be 
trusted.‖ McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); see also Tracey Maclin, The Central 
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 249 (1993) (―This distrust of police 
power is the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment.‖). Skepticism can produce fruitful dialogue 
based ―upon the idea that integral to the Constitution and our societal view of government is a 
reciprocal trust between the government and its citizens.‖ Sundby, supra note 129, at 1777. 
 208. The Free Speech Clause probably protects more speech than would be desirable from an 
ideal standpoint, but we protect more to ensure that we do not receive less than is necessary for a 
dynamic deliberative polity. If we read the Fourth Amendment alongside the First Amendment, we 
should likewise expect to restrict police practice more than is ideal in order to ensure the polity‘s 
political security.  
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Herring suggest, these differing Fourth Amendment purposes sometimes 
conflict; and when they do, there is no metanarrative to explain when or 
why one purpose should be prioritized over the other. Sometimes the 
Court emphasizes the interest of effective law enforcement practice, and 
sometimes the Court emphasizes individual privacy. Bright-line rules 
regulating police can be privacy enhancing, but the mere existence of a 
rule easily followed by the beat officer does not necessarily lead to a rule 
protecting privacy. Depending on the interest in view, the Court may 
develop doctrinal rules regulating police that protect privacy, as it does 
within the home
209
 and for warrantless electronic surveillance,
210
 or that 
fail to protect privacy, as it does with the third-party doctrine
211
 and with 
some automobile searches.
212
 As a consequence, Fourth Amendment 
doctrine lurches from one consideration to the other, with no overarching 
guidance.  
Because these competing narratives each rest on a different ―vision of 
the Amendment,‖213 it is useful to widen the frame of reference to ask how 
each narrative fits within broader readings of the Constitution. A wider 
frame allows us to see the connections between First and Fourth 
Amendment protections, and thus to see more than a contrast between 
protecting privacy and regulating police. Justice Ginsburg‘s dissent in 
Herring provides a basis for reorienting the Fourth Amendment narrative 
around a broader political purpose aimed at protecting liberty. Following 
Justice Stevens‘s dissent in Arizona v. Evans,214 Justice Ginsburg 
recognizes the liberty and dignity interests of persons made vulnerable 
when barriers are removed from government use of illegally obtained 
evidence.
215
 By contrast, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the fact that 
―[t]he exclusionary rule was crafted to curb police rather than judicial 
misconduct.‖216 Regulating police misconduct is the special province of 
the Constitution‘s ―criminal procedure‖ clauses. Judicial vision focused on 
the exclusionary rule‘s regulatory purpose places the Fourth Amendment 
alongside the criminal procedure provisions of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments. Alternatively, judicial vision focused on liberty and dignity 
places the Fourth Amendment alongside provisions like the First 
 
 
 209. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 210. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984). 
 212. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999).  
 213. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 214. 514 U.S. 1, 18–23 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 215. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 709 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. at 701 (majority opinion).  
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Amendment that secure ―the People‘s‖ rights to political liberty. Different 
constitutional cultures become possible under these differing visions and 
narratives. What reasons counsel in favor of Justice Ginsburg‘s 
constitutional vision? 
First, government officials have at their fingertips ever more powerful 
sources of information that can be used to intrude into our lives. The 
anonymity of the public speaker may increasingly be a creature of the past, 
as recognition and tracking technologies make it easier for government 
officials to monitor our public movements and activities.
217
 Moreover, 
through contemporary forms of commercial and social life, we 
promiscuously share personal information with others, which law 
unevenly regulates.
218
 Because our daily lives are often lived in the 
company of others, not in spaces of private seclusion, under the Katz 
framework, the Court has found fewer expectations of privacy to 
protect.
219
 What we reveal to others when moving on public streets and 
sidewalks, and what we disclose to others when engaging in conversations 
and transactions, form no part of current Fourth Amendment 
protections.
220
 Objecting to this reasoning, one of Justice Douglas‘s 
dissents on Fourth Amendment matters of interpersonal privacy remains 
applicable: ―[E]very individual needs both to communicate with others 
and to keep his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that 
the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and 
circumstances when he will share his secrets . . . .‖221 This ―dual aspect of 
privacy‖ is relevant to citizen participation through social networking sites 
with government officials. Does the access we grant to our information 
remain ―private,‖ or are government officials free to use this information 
for other purposes such as law enforcement?
222
 These and other questions 
remain outside the current Fourth Amendment‘s purview.  
 
 
 217. See generally SLOBOGIN, supra note 70; Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the 
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083 (2002).  
 218. Uneven availability of personal information creates a number of legal challenges outside of 
the criminal law enforcement. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of 
Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008).  
 219. As Morgan Cloud concludes: ―After a third of a century, it is fair to conclude that Katz is a 
failure, at least if its original purpose was to ensure that Fourth Amendment standards regulate the use 
of modern surveillance technologies.‖ Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The 
Supreme Court, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MISS. L.J. 5, 28–29 (2002).  
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–14 (1984); United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (―[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities . . . .‖); United States v. 
White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971).  
 221. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 222. See Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy 
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If accumulated information empowers government officials to conduct 
searches and seizures as in Herring, then it seems inescapable that 
―[n]egligent recordkeeping errors by law enforcement threaten individual 
liberty,‖223 as Justice Ginsburg argued.224 Government records maintained 
on the basis of data mining—the process of obtaining and analyzing 
recorded information about persons from private and public sources—can 
lead to individuals‘ placement on ―watch lists‖ or no-fly lists, or otherwise 
being targeted by law enforcement officials.
225
 The most iconic version of 
this process was the Total Information Awareness program, whose slogan, 
―knowledge is power,‖ was well-suited to a new public panopticon.226 
Although this particular program was abandoned, others proliferate, most 
recently through a federally funded program of information ―fusion 
centers.‖227 At least one of these data-mining initiatives, TALON (Threat 
and Local Observation Notice), focused on ordinary political protest 
activities of citizens—activities at the core of political liberty.228 The 
problem with these and other federal data-mining initiatives, as 
Christopher Slobogin argues, is that ―[c]urrent Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence appears to leave data mining completely unregulated.‖229 
 
 
Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 827 (2010) (arguing that ―government should view 
Government 2.0 sites as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see government‘s activities and 
engage in policy discussions but where government cannot use, collect, or distribute individuals‘ 
social-media information‖); see also Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 
2009); Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, WIRED, Mar. 25, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/government-agen/. 
 223. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 710 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 224. This individual liberty implicates First Amendment concerns as well. See Neil M. Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).  
 225. See, e.g., Daniel Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
343, 357 (2008) (―Some of the most significant problems of data mining involve information 
processing—the way that previously gathered information is stored, analyzed, and used. The analysis 
of data to identify people who match certain profiles resembles a dragnet search . . . .‖); Eric Lichtblau, 
F.B.I. Data Mining Reached Beyond Initial Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, at A1. 
 226. See Jeffrey Rosen, Total Information Awareness, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 15, 2002, at E128, 
E130; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE (1791); MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 204, 195–228 (Alan Sheridan trans., 
Vintage Books 1977) (―The Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory of power.‖). 
 227. See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34070, FUSION CENTERS: ISSUES AND 
OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS (2008); Hilary Hylton, Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information?, 
TIME, Mar. 9, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html; 
see also Danielle Keats Citron & Frank A. Pasquale III, Network Accountability for the Domestic 
Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2011).  
 228. See James Bamford, Private Lives: The Agency That Could Be Big Brother, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 2005, at C1; Walter Pincus, Protesters Found in Database: ACLU is Questioning Entries in 
Defense Dept. System, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2007, at A8.  
 229. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 317, 321 (2008).  
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Second, searches and seizures directly impact personal participation in 
community and political life. When a person‘s race, religion, or political 
preferences contribute to whether she is subject to search, more than her 
privacy or equal status is implicated. Her full political participation in the 
polity is at stake. To see how, contrast the Fourth Amendment with the 
Takings Clause.
230
 The Fifth Amendment permits government officials to 
take private property for public purposes with just compensation.
231
 Like 
the Fourth Amendment, there is no absolute bar to the government 
action—the Constitution permits both searches and takings. Rather, 
officials may engage in the regulated action subject to fulfillment of the 
appropriate conditions (e.g., a reasonable search or a public purpose with 
just compensation). Read alongside the Takings Clause, we might 
conclude that the Fourth Amendment‘s regulation of searches and seizures 
merely puts a proper price on an activity that produces a social good by 
enabling police to ferret out criminal wrongdoing, just as the Fifth 
Amendment provides a price for an activity that produces a social good by 
enabling completion of public projects like road construction. We do not 
want to make effective police practice too expensive by overregulating it 
and thereby risk social harm from increased levels of crime. 
Both searching and taking produce individual costs in addition to 
public benefits, as the public outcry following the Supreme Court‘s 
takings decision in Kelo v. City of New London
232
 attests. But each activity 
is compensated differently. Most importantly, the Takings Clause 
mandates compensation.
233
 On the assumption that property is fungible 
with money, when the state compensates a property owner for an eminent 
domain taking, the owner should be in roughly the same position after the 
transaction as before. By contrast, the Fourth Amendment does not 
mandate any form of compensation. A person subject to a proper search 
receives no compensation, while a person subject to an unconstitutional 
search may seek to exclude from trial any evidence found, but otherwise 
faces little prospect for compensation. The innocent person wrongfully 
searched is unlikely to seek or receive monetary damages from the 
offending officer through a civil suit. Thus, we could describe Fourth 
Amendment violations as exacting uncompensated takings from innocent 
 
 
 230. This comparison was helpfully suggested to me by Orin Kerr.  
 231. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Penn Cent. 
Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
 232. 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that a municipality acts within the Fifth Amendment‘s public 
use requirement when it takes individual property as part of a planned comprehensive city 
redevelopment project).  
 233. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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victims to achieve the public purposes of regulating crime. The 
uncompensated costs of searches go beyond any monetary value because 
these costs affect a person‘s sense of standing and security within the 
community. Searches can impose ―chilling effects‖ on individuals‘ ability 
and willingness to engage in public social and political activities when 
they fear unpleasant interactions with police. Like infringements on First 
Amendment rights to speak, assemble, and petition, the costs of 
unconstitutional searches affect the deliberative prospects of the wider 
polity. From a political liberty perspective, we have more to fear from 
government search and surveillance than from the exercise of eminent 
domain. 
Finally, flourishing political life requires the freedom to think, listen, 
and speak with others openly in public space, without the fear of 
repercussions, whether in the form of sanctions or in the form of unwanted 
government surveillance.
234
 Uninhibited and robust political life therefore 
requires the protections afforded by both the First and Fourth 
Amendments. If the First Amendment protects no more than the ability to 
speak in private, then it would protect little that is of political value.
235
 To 
speak alone to oneself does little to fulfill the promise of free speech. 
Similarly, a Fourth Amendment that protects no more than the secrets we 
seek to keep provides scant protection for our actual social lives. Being 
left alone only when in solitude fails to fulfill ―the Blessings of Liberty‖ 
promised to ―the People‖ by the Constitution. Justice Ginsburg‘s 
constitutional vision would reconnect the Fourth Amendment to broader 
concerns for political liberty. These connections have not gone 
unrecognized in the Supreme Court‘s decisions: ―The Bill of Rights was 
fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted power of 
search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of 
expression.‖236 This alternative vision seeks to recover the forgotten 
 
 
 234. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940) (―The freedom of speech and of 
the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and 
truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.‖ 
(footnote omitted)); see also Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587 (2007).  
 235. I do not mean to suggest that private formation of ideas is not important, nor that a sphere of 
privacy is not important for self-development. Rather, these by themselves, while necessary, are 
insufficient for political life. Moreover, both are vulnerable to pervasive surveillance. See Julie E. 
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 
1426–27 (2000) (―A robust and varied debate on matters of public concern requires the opportunity to 
experiment with self-definition in private, and (if one desires) to keep distinct social, commercial, and 
political associations separate from one another.‖). 
 236. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961). 
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political bearings of the Fourth Amendment. It is precisely this focus on 
the nature of official conduct as ―totally subversive of . . . liberty‖ that 
motivated the construction of the Fourth Amendment through political 
liberty cases, such as Wilkes v. Wood,
237
 which share an underlying First 
Amendment interest in the publication of political pamphlets. This third 
narrative focuses on political liberty, for which privacy may play a 
significant role but does not constitute the whole story. Beyond the 
practical considerations of public surveillance and public political life, the 
Fourth Amendment‘s historical origin, as well as its textual focus on a 
―right of the people,‖ provides a solid basis for reviving a third narrative. 
As the next part argues, the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment 
are based on cases attending to the common interests shared by both the 
First and the Fourth Amendments in limiting state interference with 
political liberties.
238
  
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT BEGINNINGS AND SEDITIOUS LIBEL 
To begin at the beginning is to cover familiar scholarly terrain.
239
 
English and American courts established important precedents vindicating 
revolutionary colonists‘ claims of freedom from arbitrary and intrusive 
practices of searches and seizures by governing officials.
240
 In the 
beginning, political liberty was a central issue because abusive searches 
and seizures undermined ―the People‘s‖ political and private security. As 
it has evolved, the Fourth Amendment evinces little concern for broader 
questions of political liberty. Instead, the modern Fourth Amendment has 
developed an intricate set of procedures designed to regulate police in their 
conduct of ordinary criminal investigation, leaving to other Amendments 
 
 
 237. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.B.). 
 238. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 
(2007). Solove argues that ―the First Amendment should serve as an independent source of procedure 
to protect expressive and associational activity from government information gathering.‖ Id. at 151. 
Solove‘s contribution is important because he reads the First Amendment as a special ―source of 
criminal procedure.‖ Id. at 114. This Article moves in the opposite direction, reading the Fourth 
Amendment as a source of protections for political liberty. Whether reading the First Amendment as 
criminal procedure or reading the Fourth Amendment as protecting political liberty, the most 
important development is to bring the law of search and seizure closer to the liberty-enhancing values 
protected by other constitutional provisions—most significantly, the First Amendment. 
 239. See generally THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND 
INTERPRETATION (2008); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL 
MEANING 602–1791 (2009).  
 240. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1029 (C.P.); Wilkes v. Wood, 
(1763) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1153 (C.P.) 1167; Paxton‘s Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761), in 2 LEGAL 
PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123–34 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).  
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the essential task of securing the liberty of ―the People.‖ To begin to see 
how this division of constitutional labor is a modern and contingent 
construct, we must first reconstruct the narrative in which political liberty 
was, and continues to be, a Fourth Amendment value. Reading the First 
Amendment in relation to the Fourth, as this Article does, has deep roots 
in our constitutional history.  
A. The Child Independence 
The Fourth Amendment is rooted in cases that have as much to do with 
political speech as they do with searches and seizures. Publishing 
pamphlets critical of the Crown could be a risky endeavor, as John Entick 
and John Wilkes each discovered in eighteenth-century England.
241
 Risk 
arose because they were subject to prosecution under seditious libel for 
speaking publicly in criticism of Crown officials. Criticizing political 
authorities was thought to be dangerous because it denigrated the dignity 
of Crown officials and could lead to public discontent.
242
 To criticize the 
sovereign was to criticize the body of the state.
243
 No state body could 
remain healthy if subject to the disease of discontent. It was therefore 
incumbent on state officials to root out seditious libel for the health and 
security of the state.  
In 1762, John Entick published pamphlets critical of Crown officials.
244
 
Pursuing a claim for seditious libel, the British Secretary of State, Lord 
Halifax, issued warrants to search Entick‘s home and seize his papers.245 
The warrant was executed and the papers seized.
246
 Entick subsequently 
sued in trespass.
247
 A jury awarded him damages,
248
 and in an opinion 
 
 
 241. This history is recounted in a number of sources. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 26, at 13; 
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION 43–50 (1937); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 562–70 (1999); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of 
Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396–404 (1995). 
 242. ―An attack on the dignity or respectability of authority was deemed to undermine its 
credibility and to subvert the affection of its subjects in the same manner that libel or slander injured 
an individual‘s reputation. Similarly, seditious libel was thought to disturb the inner tranquility of the 
state and throw its members into a distemper just as defamation was thought to disturb the inner 
tranquility of a person.‖ Judith Schenck Koffler & Bennett L. Gershman, The New Seditious Libel, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 816, 821 (1984).  
 243. See generally ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING‘S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL 
POLITICAL THOUGHT (1957).  
 244. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1029 (C.P.) 1031. See LASSON, supra 
note 241, at 47. 
 245. Entick, 19 Howell‘s State Trials at 1031. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 1030. 
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famous at the time of the American Founding, Lord Camden upheld the 
verdict, reasoning that officials had no power to seize personal papers:  
[I]t is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means 
of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. . . .  
 In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and 
yet there are some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, 
robbery, and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, 
that are more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no 
paper-search in these cases to help forward the conviction.
249
  
This broad ruling protected the privacy of papers against searches pursuant 
to general warrants, which lacked specificity or probable cause and which 
sought to discover evidence for use in seditious libel prosecutions. Lord 
Camden‘s opinion was not only important in the minds of constitutional 
drafters, but has also been important in Supreme Court precedent.
250
 
Justice Bradley wrote in Boyd v. United States, a case finding both Fourth 
and Fifth Amendment values at stake in the seizure of property for use as 
evidence, that ―[t]he principles laid down in this opinion affect the very 
essence of constitutional liberty and security.‖251 Justice Bradley also 
noted that Lord Camden‘s opinion has been ―considered as one of the 
landmarks of English liberty. It was welcomed and applauded by the 
lovers of liberty in the colonies as well.‖252  
John Wilkes was a Member of Parliament who also published a series 
of pamphlets critical of Crown officials, though he did so anonymously.
253
 
Lord Halifax again issued warrants, which were this time served against 
not only Mr. Wilkes, but a large number of his associates.
254
 Officials 
arrested forty-nine persons, in the process searching Wilkes‘ home and 
 
 
 248. Id. at 1036 (awarding damages of £300). 
 249. Id. at 1073. 
 250. See LASSON, supra note 241, at 47; TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND SURVEILLANCE AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 38–44 
(1969).  
 251. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
 252. Id. at 626. 
 253. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1153 (C.P.) 1167; CUDDIHY, supra note 
239, at 440–43; LASSON, supra note 241, at 43; see also WALTER F. PRATT, PRIVACY IN BRITAIN 55–
56 (1979). 
 254. The warrant had no restriction on who or where officials could search, authorizing Crown 
officials ―to make strict and diligent search for the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and 
treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, No. 45 . . . .‖ The Case of John Wilkes, 19 Howell‘s 
State Trials 981 (1763); see also LASSON, supra note 241, at 43. 
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seizing his books, manuscripts, and papers.
255
 Wilkes and his associates 
sued in trespass, and a jury awarded him a substantial verdict of one 
thousand pounds.
256
 As in Entick, Lord Camden upheld the verdict, 
reasoning:  
The defendants claimed a right, under precedents, to force persons 
houses, break open escrutores, seize their papers, &c. upon a 
general warrant, where no inventory is made of the things thus 
taken away, and where no offenders names are specified in the 
warrant, and therefore a discretionary power given to messengers to 
search wherever their suspicions may chance to fall. If such a power 
is truly invested in a Secretary of State, and he can delegate this 
power, it certainly may affect the person and property of every man 
in this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of the 
subject.
257
  
It is noteworthy that the defendants to the trespass action were not police 
officers, since the London police were not first organized until 1829.
258
 
They were persons acting on behalf of the Secretary of State against a 
Member of Parliament. The crime about which they sought evidence was 
not ―murder, rape, robbery and house-breaking,‖ as Lord Camden 
contrasted in Entick,
259
 but a political crime—criticizing state officials.260 
For ordinary crime, the self-informing jury of peers, persons of the 
vicinage who had knowledge of the crime, did the investigating.
261
 Crown 
officials ordinarily arrived only when others had gathered enough 
evidence to arrest individuals and would conduct searches incident to the 
arrest.
262
 In Wilkes‘s case, the search was not incident to an arrest, but was 
itself an attempt to find the papers, manuscripts, and books needed to 
convict Wilkes of seditious libel.
263
  
 
 
 255. See CUDDIHY, supra note 239, at 442–43. 
 256. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1153 (C.P.) 1168. 
 257. Wilkes, 19 Howell‘s State Trials at 1167.  
 258. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the 
Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 (1983) (discussing consequences of the fact that London 
lacked an organized police force until ―Sir Robert Peel's Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 founded the 
‗bobbies‘‖ (footnote omitted)).  
 259. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell‘s State Trials 1029 (C.B.) 1073. 
 260. Wilkes, 19 Howell‘s State Trials at 1166. 
 261. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 313, 314–15 (1973). 
 262. See Langbein, supra note 258, at 55–60; see also Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 830–32 (1994); Stuntz, supra note 241, at 401.  
 263. Parliament also sought to deprive Wilkes of his seat, a further aspect of the case that 
resounded in America. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527–31 (1969).  
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The general warrant did not limit the power of state agents to specific 
persons or things and was not supported by probable cause—key 
components of the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Lord Camden 
identified, was the political ramification of the Secretary having such 
power to ―affect the person and property of every man in the kingdom,‖ in 
a way that is ―totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.‖264 Although 
the British did not have the equivalent of our First Amendment as a basis 
for challenging the legality of the substantive offense of seditious libel, the 
limitations on official power served similar ends. If in order to prosecute a 
political crime, the state were entitled to search whomever and wherever, 
liberty would be totally subverted. The liberty interest—not an interest in 
the privacy and sanctity of the home for an individual‘s own sake—is the 
central concern of the Wilkes case. Liberty was to be protected through 
procedural limitations on the ability of government agents to search for 
evidence, not through a facial challenge to the substantive law they sought 
to vindicate. Procedural limitations found a home in Fourth Amendment 
text, which explicitly protects against the unconstrained discretion 
attending general warrants.  
A final eighteenth-century precedent, this time involving events that 
occurred in Boston, emphasized the dangers that accompany the power to 
execute general warrants. In Paxton’s Case (also known as the Writs of 
Assistance or Petition of Lechmere case), James Otis argued on behalf of 
merchants who had been subject to searches by customs officials 
authorized by general warrants.
265
 Issuance of general warrants was 
authorized in the colonies by the Act of Frauds of 1696, empowering 
customs officials—based solely on their own suspicion—to search 
anywhere they might find contraband.
266
 In particular, Otis‘s argument 
was directed toward the liberty to be free from government intrusion in the 
home, claiming that ―one of the most essential branches of English liberty, 
is the freedom of one's house.‖267 Here again, the underlying conduct was 
 
 
 264. Wilkes, 19 Howell‘s State Trials at 1167.  
 265. Paxton‘s Case, Quincy 51 (Mass. 1761), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 123–34 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965). The title of the case varies, as noted by CUDDIHY, supra 
note 239, at 382 n.26. On the significance of the case, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 
(1886) (―‗Then and there,‘ said John Adams, ‗then and there was the first scene of the first act of 
opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was 
born.‘‖); M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 316–17 (1978).  
 266. See SMITH, supra note 265, at 25, 51–66.  
 267. Id. at 344. James Otis further argued: ―A man‘s house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he 
is as well guarded as a prince in his castle.—This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally 
annihilate this privilege.‖ Id.  
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no ordinary criminal offense, but was a politically charged question of 
trade limitations.  
Privacy in the home was an important feature of the colonialists‘ 
complaint, but this value was understood in terms of political liberty—
freedom from state interference in spheres of the colonialists‘ lives—not 
merely in terms of personal privacy.
268
 As Otis argued, the use of Writs of 
Assistance constituted ―the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most 
destructive of English liberty, that ever was found in an English law 
book.‖269 Resistance to arbitrary power and its destructive effects on 
political liberty gave rise to revolutionary political claims. John Adams 
claimed of Otis‘s arguments that 
American independence was then and there born; the seeds of 
patriots and heroes were then and there sown . . . . Every man of a 
crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take 
arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene 
of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. 
Then and there the child Independence was born.
270
 
If American political independence was born, at least in some part, from 
contestation over general warrants,
271
 then the Fourth Amendment can 
have an important role to play in preserving a political liberty that extends 
beyond regulating police or protecting privacy. As important as these 
purposes may be, Entick, Wilkes, and Paxton’s Case all speak to broader 
concerns over the power of government officials to constrain the liberty of 
persons in their political and public dealings with each other.  
B. A Division of Constitutional Labor 
As it has developed in the twentieth century, Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has focused almost exclusively on protecting privacy by 
regulating police investigation of crimes such as drug possession, murder, 
rape, and robbery. Even though the Court has placed increased emphasis 
 
 
 268. See, e.g., William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: 
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 386–87, 
394–97 (1980).  
 269. LASSON, supra note 241, at 59 (quotation omitted).  
 270. Letter from John Adams to William Tudor (Mar. 29, 1817), in 10 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 247–48 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Little, 
Brown & Co. 1856).  
 271. Unlike Wilkes and Entick, the importance of Paxton’s Case to the writing of the Fourth 
Amendment is contested. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 66 (1998). 
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE POLITICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 351 
 
 
 
 
on protecting the privacy of places such as the home,
272
 as Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence first emerged, the connection between liberty 
and privacy remained. In Boyd v. United States, Justice Bradley 
emphasized the fact that Entick and Wilkes 
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its 
employés of the sanctity of a man‘s home and the privacies of life. 
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his 
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the 
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property, where that right has never been 
forfeited by his conviction of some public offence.
273
 
Security, liberty, and property were all to be protected through limitations 
on the power of government officials to engage in investigatory searches. 
Privacy was to become the linchpin of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
only when the focus turned to protecting persons in places where they 
sought to shield themselves from the eyes and ears of others.
274
 Liberty 
and security remain equally important, even if they are often latent Fourth 
Amendment values.  
As a means of regulating official intervention in the political lives of 
citizens, relying only upon procedural limitations to searches would not be 
enough. After all, John Wilkes was still convicted of seditious libel.
275
 
Nothing in his successful trespass suit affected the legality of the 
underlying prosecution. Lacking anything like a modern exclusionary rule, 
there was no further political check, at least where the conviction could 
not be nullified by a jury of his peers. Early American constitutional 
history faced a similar problem.  
Under a Federalist administration and Congress, seditious libel was 
prohibited by statute in 1798 out of the same fears of the disease of 
 
 
 272. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610 (1999) (referring to the ―centuries-old principle 
of respect for the privacy of the home‖); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (―The Fourth 
Amendment protects the individual‘s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy 
more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual‘s 
home . . . .‖).  
 273. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
 274. As the Court explained in the seminal modern Fourth Amendment case: ―What a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.‖ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) 
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 275. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 527 (1969).  
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discontent that animated British prosecutions.
276
 Newspaper editors, such 
as Thomas Cooper, and politicians, such as Vermont Congressman 
Matthew Lyon, were prosecuted and convicted for speech criticizing John 
Adams‘s Federalist administration.277 Although the Act expired in 1801, 
Congress passed other acts during times of national crisis intending to 
suppress dissent, such as the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act 
of 1918.
278
 These new attempts were tested substantively rather than 
procedurally, slowly awakening the modern First Amendment tradition. 
Prosecutions for disseminating ―dangerous ideas‖ were upheld against 
First Amendment challenges during the First World War,
279
 the first red 
scare,
280
 and the second red scare during the Cold War.
281
 A tradition 
developed through Justice Holmes‘s dissent in Abrams v. United States282 
and Justice Brandeis‘s concurrence in Whitney v. California,283 however, 
that began to protect speech through substantive limitations on the 
application of the underlying criminal statutes.
284
  
During this history, the Fourth Amendment played little role in limiting 
the power of officials to prosecute individuals for their speech. The Fourth 
Amendment was increasingly occupied with regulating criminal 
investigations.
285
 It was through the First Amendment that the Supreme 
Court finally made clear that officials cannot prosecute individuals for 
merely criticizing the government.
286
 Thus, we have a division of labor: 
 
 
 276. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (providing for the punishment of certain crimes 
against the United States).  
 277. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 33–73 (2004). For 
more on the acrimonious election of 1800, which the Sedition Act had sought to influence, see BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).  
 278. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–794); Sedition Act 
of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1921, h. 136, 41 Stat. 1359-60.. 
 279. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding prosecution for circulating 
pamphlets said to violate the Espionage Act).  
 280. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 281. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).  
 282. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672–73 
(Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 283. 274 U.S. 357, 372–79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969).  
 284. Following Whitney, the Court struck down convictions for subversive advocacy in a number 
of cases. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Harry 
Kalven, Jr., provides a masterful overview of the development of the free speech tradition from its 
anemic start in the Holmes dissents and the Brandeis concurrence to its robust flowering under the 
Warren Court. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 
167–236 (1988).  
 285. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 
(1961); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).  
 286. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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the First Amendment protects substantive political rights to speak, 
assemble, and petition the government, while the Fourth Amendment 
protects against arbitrary criminal process. Does this division adequately 
reflect constitutional meaning, structure, and history regarding the 
protection of political liberty?
287
 Because Fourth Amendment doctrine has 
developed an almost exclusive focus on protecting privacy by regulating 
police investigation of ordinary crime, there is good reason to doubt the 
necessity of this exclusive division. The Court‘s jurisprudence regulating 
police provides a narrow construction of privacy as secret or undisclosed 
to others.
288
 Privacy is defeated, and thus no constitutional search occurs, 
when police examine places and persons that have been publicly 
exposed.
289
 But political liberty is realized in the company of others, most 
notably in the freedom to associate with others and to peaceably assemble. 
These are public activities, not activities that remain private and 
undisclosed to others. Of course, regulating police practice has little to do 
directly with political liberty. If we attend to the Fourth Amendment‘s 
historical setting of seditious libel cases, which present the arbitrary use of 
power for political purposes, we are better able to see that ―[t]his history 
was, of course, part of the intellectual matrix within which our own 
constitutional fabric was shaped,‖290 a fabric that includes many threads 
comprising a powerful weave. As the Supreme Court has recognized, 
speaking of cases such as Wilkes and Entick, ―[i]t was in the context of the 
latter kinds of general warrants that the battle for individual liberty and 
privacy was finally won.‖291 Privacy is not a Fourth Amendment value 
isolated from liberty.  
Following these historical precedents, it is a mistake to focus Fourth 
Amendment protections exclusively on privacy. Such an exclusive 
 
 
 287. These are only three modalities of constitutional interpretation, though others may be 
relevant. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1982).  
 288. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (noting that we relinquish an expectation 
that information we reveal to others ―will remain secret‖); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 
(1967) (―What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.‖).  
 289. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (―It is well settled that when an 
individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that 
information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit 
governmental use of that information.‖); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983) 
(concluding that when the defendant ―traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to 
anyone who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular 
direction‖).  
 290. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961). 
 291. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 483 (1965).  
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conception of privacy has little place in the historical precedents, as we 
have seen, which focused on limiting the political power of government 
officials to investigate and prosecute political crimes. In relation to 
seditious libel or the arbitrary power of customs officials, liberty was the 
central value. Moreover, a value in protecting only what is publicly 
undisclosed does not fit well with an eighteenth-century conception of 
ordinary life.
292
 Communities and homes were not constructed or occupied 
in ways that led to expectations of privacy as undisclosed to others.
293
 
Community life was life lived in public, not private. There was no fully 
modern equivalent of ―private life‖ lived apart from the community. 
Modern privacy is a social construct, conceptually cultivated and 
practically produced in forms of everyday life.
294
 The modern Fourth 
Amendment‘s focus on personal privacy in relation to police practice has 
generated a number of jurisprudential anomalies and has obscured the 
Amendment‘s political protections. As this Article argues, the Fourth 
Amendment continues to have an important and underemphasized role to 
play in protecting against the subversion of liberty. To recognize the 
important protections the Fourth Amendment affords to political liberty 
requires us to focus on protecting the ―rights of the people‖ as a collective 
and sovereign political body. Reading the Fourth Amendment‘s protection 
for a ―right of the people‖ in light of the other constitutional provisions 
referring to ―rights of the people‖ accentuates the importance of political 
liberty.  
III. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 
Privacy, as the central value of this modern doctrine, is not textually 
referenced in the Fourth Amendment. No doubt, privacy can be inferred 
from what the Amendment specifically protects—persons, papers, and 
places. But, as this brief overview of Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
 
 
 292. See A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE III: PASSIONS OF THE RENAISSANCE 493–529 (Roger 
Chartier ed., Arthur Goldhammer trans., 1989); MICHAEL MCKEON, THE SECRET HISTORY OF 
DOMESTICITY 212–68 (2005).  
 293. See sources cited supra note 293; see also Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 
CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1132–40 (2002).  
 294. The ―right to be let alone‖ as a form of privacy was first conceptualized in the late nineteenth 
century, enabling it to take on its more modern guise in Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). If it were already a recognized and embedded value, 
then there would have been nothing at all noteworthy about the authors‘ famous article. ―Thus, when 
Warren and Brandeis sound the alarm in 1890 they do so not to protect or mourn privacy, but to 
produce it—in a particular guise, and toward a particular purpose.‖ KATHERINE ADAMS, OWNING UP: 
PRIVACY, PROPERTY, AND BELONGING IN U.S. WOMEN‘S LIFE WRITING 6 (2009).  
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history attests, this central analytic feature has been read into the 
Amendment.
295
 In protecting ―reasonable expectations of privacy‖296 and 
recognizing a ―right to privacy, no less important than any other right 
carefully and particularly reserved to the people,‖297 the Warren Court also 
protected ―a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.‖298 This latter 
development, ambiguously perched among the ―penumbras‖ and 
―emanations‖ from ―specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights,‖299 
eventually found a more precise textual home in the liberty component of 
the Due Process Clause.
300
 In so doing, due process privacy remained 
tethered to its broader political right of liberty. By contrast, Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections have developed in relative independence 
from broader constitutional commitments and textual themes. Curiously, 
in all of the detailed rules of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence aimed at 
regulating police to protect privacy, five important words have dropped 
from view. The first five words of the Amendment are ―[t]he right of the 
people.‖301  
As the Court has recognized, ―the People‖ is an important term of art in 
constitutional construction.
302
 From its opening words, ―We the People,‖ 
the Constitution brings into existence a national polity, performing the 
creation of ―[a] People‖ even as it presupposes their political sovereignty. 
―[T]he People‖ are foremost a political body, the grounds for all political 
legitimacy of government action. Political power resides with ―the 
People,‖ and it is only upon their consent that the institutions of 
government operate. As ―Publius‖ explained: ―The genius of republican 
liberty, seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should be 
derived from the people; but that those entrusted with it should be kept in 
dependence on the people . . . .‖303 Bypassing the authority of the states as 
 
 
 295. In other contexts, the Court has been exposed to withering criticism for protecting a textually 
unspecified right to privacy. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe 
v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 936–37 (1973) (―At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the 
values the Constitution marks for special protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never 
before has its sense of an obligation to draw one been so obviously lacking.‖). By contrast, there has 
been little criticism of the Court‘s claim that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
privacy.  
 296. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 297. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).  
 298. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).  
 299. Id. at 484.  
 300. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (upholding ―a promise 
of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter‖).  
 301. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 302. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790–91 (2008). 
 303. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).  
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sovereigns, the new Constitution reposed power in ―the People‖ 
themselves.
304
 As the debates over constitutional ratification developed, 
the question of specific right guarantees led Alexander Hamilton to argue 
that ―[h]ere, in strictness, the people . . . retain everything [and] have no 
need of particular reservations.‖305 ―[T]he People‖ were empowered to 
choose the members of the House of Representatives, suggesting the close 
political connection between ―the People‖ and their governing 
representatives.
306
 Despite arguments against the need for a specific Bill of 
Rights, ten amendments were added in 1791, several of which confirmed 
the centrality of ―the People.‖ In addition to the Fourth Amendment‘s 
protection of the ―right of the people,‖307 the First Amendment protects 
―the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances,‖308 while the Second Amendment 
refers to a ―right of the people to keep and bear Arms.‖309 Indeed, the 
Ninth Amendment assures against denial or disparagement rights ―retained 
by the people,‖310 and the Tenth Amendment confirms powers ―reserved 
. . . to the people.‖311 
Rights protections among the amendments are not always granted to 
―the People.‖ The Fifth Amendment protects persons under due process 
and other provisions, while the Sixth Amendment guarantees rights to the 
accused in criminal prosecutions. Both the Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments protect the role of juries, a political body closely associated 
with ―the People‖ themselves.312 ―We the People,‖ however, are not 
synonymous with the individual persons who comprise the sovereign 
body. Indeed, the founding Constitution‘s protections for ―persons‖ 
included those such as women or noncitizens who could not vote and were 
not full participants in the republican polity. The need to protect the rights 
of persons, and their prospects for a more inclusive equal citizenship, 
 
 
 304. James Madison described the important ability to circumvent the states because ―the people 
were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They 
could alter constitutions as they pleased.‖ GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 1776–87, 533 (1969) (footnote omitted).  
 305. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).  
 306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. 
 307. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 308. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 309. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 310. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 311. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 312. According to Akhil Amar, the role of juries is also closely connected to the ―right of the 
people‖: ―No idea was more central to our Bill of Rights—indeed, to America‘s distinctive regime of 
government of the people, by the people, and for the people—than the idea of the jury.‖ AMAR, supra 
note 26, at 161.  
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE POLITICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 357 
 
 
 
 
formed a basis for reconstituting the fundamental constitutional structure 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The process of creating an expanded 
national community required overturning Dred Scott v. Sandford
313
 and 
recognizing the equal citizenship of ―all persons.‖ This national struggle 
for recognition reaffirmed the vitality and importance of preserving the 
―rights of the people‖ as equal citizens and their republican participation in 
the polity. Given this contrast between persons and ―the People,‖ what 
effect does reference to rights and powers of ―the People‖ have for 
constitutional interpretation?  
One answer emphasizes the role that popular constitutionalism has to 
play, not only for politics, but also as a source of constitutional meaning. 
The usual narrative of judicial review reposes ultimate power to say what 
the law is in the judiciary.
314
 The 1789 Constitution, however, provided 
mechanisms for constitutional change that reside with ―the People.‖ Thus, 
under this narrative, the judiciary interprets the Constitution in light of any 
changes wrought by popular amendment. When the Constitution is stable, 
the judiciary‘s duty is to uphold the will of ―the People‖ against any 
contrary ordinary legislation.
315
 Absent popular involvement in the formal 
amendment process, ―the People‖ have little role to play. When ―the 
People‖ are otherwise engaged in the pursuits of private life, the Court‘s 
task is to act as guardians over constitutional text and meaning, having the 
last word on all interpretive matters.
316
 
 
 
 313. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV.  
 314. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (―It is emphatically the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.‖); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 
(1958) (―[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that 
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.‖).  
 315. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (―[T]he Constitution ought to be 
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.‖).  
 316. Even when the Court plays the role of constitutional guardian, the scope of judicial review 
and the method of constitutional interpretation remain very much contested. For a small sampling, see, 
for example, BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE]; ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM‘S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–38 (1996); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION (2008); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Bruce Ackerman, The Living 
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, The Living Constitution]; David 
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996); James B. 
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 
(1893). Constitutional interpretation requires an ongoing conversation in which we manifest ―at least a 
limited constitutional faith,‖ committing us ―not to closure but only to a process of becoming and to 
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Contesting this notion, a second general response recognizes the role of 
popular sovereignty, emphasizing the everyday actions ―the People‖ can 
take in contesting and constructing constitutional meaning. Larry Kramer, 
for example, argues that the supremacy of judicial review should be 
supplanted by popular authority over constitutional meaning.
317
 Because 
the Constitution was an act of popular will, ―the People‖ retain final 
interpretive authority over the Constitution‘s meaning, creating a 
constitutional practice of regular popular participation.
318
 Bruce Ackerman 
argues that ―We the People‖ have an ongoing role to play in enabling 
major constitutional transformations outside the formal amendment 
process through our efforts to enshrine new constitutional meanings as 
fundamental law.
319
 ―[T]he People‖ are not some historic body who gave 
life to the Constitution and then disappeared, but are a living body 
participating in ongoing debates over constitutional culture and retaining 
the power to transform constitutional meaning through extended popular 
involvement in political processes.
320
 To place ―the People, not the Court, 
at the center of constitutional development,‖ is to insist  
that ordinary Americans, led by such figures as Franklin Roosevelt 
and Martin Luther King, Jr., have made as large a constitutional 
contribution as the generations led by George Washington and 
Abraham Lincoln—and that the job of the Supreme Court is to 
recognize this point when making sense of the living 
Constitution.
321
  
When it comes to understanding our intergenerational constitutional 
commitments, ―the People‖ both ordained and established the Constitution 
and continue to play a central role in sustaining constitutional culture.  
Neither of these two views tells us how to understand the ―right of the 
people‖ in the Fourth Amendment. The first tells us only that the judiciary 
 
 
taking responsibility for constructing the political vision towards which [we] strive . . . .‖ SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 193 (1988). 
 317. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 247 (2004) (―[T]o control the Supreme Court, we must first lay claim to the 
Constitution ourselves. That means publicly repudiating Justices who say that they, not we, possess 
ultimate authority to say what the Constitution means.‖).  
 318. See id. at 8 (―Final interpretive authority rested with ‗the people themselves,‘ and courts no 
less than elected representatives were subordinate to their judgments.‖).  
 319. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 316, at 384.  
 320. Ackerman writes: ―For me, ‗the People‘ is not the name of a superhuman being, but the name 
of an extended process of interaction between political elites and ordinary citizens‖ who have a 
particular role to play during ―constitutional moments.‖ Id. at 187. 
 321. Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 316, at 1804–05.  
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is supreme in interpreting the scope of this right. The second view, 
however, is more fruitful because it provides a useful answer to our 
question about the relation of ―the People‖ to constitutional meaning. It 
acknowledges the ongoing importance of ―the People‖ as a political 
body—whether involved in constitutional interpretation, constitutional 
politics, or constitutional transformation. Given the repeated invocation of 
―the People‖ as possessing rights and powers, and given the constitutional 
purpose to establish ―a government which derives all its powers directly or 
indirectly from the great body of the people,‖322 constitutional 
interpretation must acknowledge the important status of ―the People.‖ 
Beyond their role as sovereigns, and beyond their role in creating and 
sustaining a national community, ―the People‖ are the objects of textually 
specific rights and powers.  
Little judicial attention has been paid to the interpretive significance of 
―the People‖ when considering the constitutional meaning of their 
protected rights and powers. Seeking to counter the claim that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms is a collective right, the majority in District 
of Columbia v. Heller claimed that other provisions protecting ―the 
People‖ ―unambiguously refer to individual rights, not ‗collective‘ rights, 
or rights that may be exercised only through participation in some 
corporate body.‖323 Although the argumentative aim is directed elsewhere, 
the Heller majority commented that ―the term unambiguously refers to all 
members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.‖324 The 
logic of these claims is anything but ―unambiguous‖ since the reduction of 
a ―right of the people‖ to an individual, private right requires careful 
attention to constitutional structure, text, and history, all of which point to 
the important role of ―the People,‖ not the individual person. Significantly, 
the majority admits that ―the People‖ refers to a political community, and 
whatever else the Court says about whether the right is held as an 
―individual‖ or ―collective‖ right, the intrinsic political import of the term 
is affirmed. In another context, the Court explained that the constitutional 
text ―suggests that ‗the people‘ protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . 
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community.‖325 Here, 
however, reference to a class of aggregated persons does not exhaust the 
term‘s meaning.  
 
 
 322. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison).  
 323. 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008). 
 324. Id. at 2790–91. 
 325. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).  
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―The People,‖ as the repository of republican civic virtue, sought to 
secure their rights through constitutional text and structure. As ―Publius‖ 
explains in The Federalist No. 51, dividing government into ―distinct and 
separate departments‖ provides ―a double security . . . to the rights of the 
people.‖326 A republican form of government, however, requires more than 
structure. It also requires participation. Security from improper 
interference by governing institutions and officials also affects ―the 
People‘s‖ full participation in and enjoyment of all the ―Blessings of 
Liberty.‖ For example, the First Amendment right to assemble and petition 
the government protects a public, collective ability to act in concert to 
effect political ends.
327
 In order to live lives in which public collective 
action is possible, people must also be secure in the liberty of shared social 
life in their homes and in their persons. The political right of ―the People‖ 
may be manifest as an individual right to be secure in ―their persons,‖ but 
the collective political right transcends the interests of private individuals. 
Focusing on privacy alone misses the broader political implications of the 
―right of the people to be secure‖ through the protections afforded by the 
Fourth Amendment.  
A. The People as Jurors 
There is a strong tendency to view the Fourth Amendment as focused 
on individual persons, despite the fact that the textual grammar is rendered 
in the plural. For example, Akhil Amar writes: ―The Fourth Amendment, 
after all, focused on individual persons as core rights‘ bearers, yet 
nevertheless involved the people (via civil juries) as implementers and 
interpreters of the rights at stake.‖328 If the Fourth Amendment focused on 
―individual persons,‖ it did not textually say so. If the Fourth Amendment 
depended on juries as the primary source of its protection, it did not 
textually say so. The Amendment is written in the plural, purposing to 
secure a ―right of the people . . . in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.‖  
 
 
 326. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).  
 327. See, e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 
(1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) 
(―The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet 
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances.‖); see 
also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. 
REV. 1239 (2008).  
 328. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 329 (2005).  
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Amar is not alone in failing to attend to the Fourth Amendment‘s 
grammar, though he has been vocal in criticizing others for failing ―to read 
the amendment‘s words and take them seriously.‖329 No doubt, Amar‘s 
primary critical focus is on the pervasive claim that the Fourth 
Amendment requires warrants backed by probable cause. Amar argues that 
if we attend to the explicit terms of the text, we will see ―the basic Fourth 
Amendment mandate was not the warrant, not probable cause, but 
reasonableness.‖330 Even if this reading of the text is correct, to focus only 
on the mandate to government officials to be ―reasonable‖ does not yet tell 
us much about the plural and shared purpose of securing a ―right of the 
people.‖ Focused on providing arguments for the republican virtue of civil 
juries as the remedial source for constitutional violations rather than on the 
modern warrant requirement, Amar places the Fourth Amendment in the 
context of the Seventh Amendment,
331
 ignoring any further textual 
significance of the ―right of the people.‖332 The Fourth Amendment, 
however, looks very different when read in the company of the other 
criminal process provisions, in addition to the Seventh Amendment, than 
when grouped among the political liberty provisions protecting ―rights of 
the people.‖ Seen from the perspective of a special domain of 
constitutional criminal procedure, ―the People‖ provide an important 
political check to unreasonable searches and seizures through their service 
on civil juries. Because constitutional text does not explicitly provide for 
the exclusion of evidence, according to Amar the civil jury becomes the 
mechanism of political control over unwarranted police intrusions. The 
question of Fourth Amendment remedy thus compels a reading of Fourth 
Amendment rights. ―What better body than a jury of ‗the people‘—a jury 
that truly looks like America—to cherish and protect this precious 
right?‖333 Under Amar‘s reading, this precious right fits comfortably 
within a narrative of regulating reasonable police practice.  
 
 
 329. AMAR, supra note 26, at 2. Amar claims that ―[t]he Fourth Amendment today is an 
embarrassment,‖ because, among other confusions, it ignores the explicit text. Id. at 1. He writes: ―The 
words of the Fourth Amendment really do mean what they say.‖ Id. at 3. Moreover, ―[t]extual 
argument is, as I have said, a proper starting point for proper constitutional analysis.‖ Id. at 153.  
 330. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 
1097, 1101 (1998).  
 331. See AMAR, supra note 26, at 13 (―History also reveals strong linkages between the Fourth 
and Seventh Amendments that previous clause-bound scholarship about each amendment in isolation 
has overlooked.‖).  
 332. See id. at 67–77.  
 333. AMAR, supra note 26, at 45. Perhaps the jury will ―look like America,‖ but the subject of a 
search will more often look like a minority of America. See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 205, at 1278.  
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If we accept, at least in part, Amar‘s central point—that the civil jury is 
a body comprised of representatives of ―the People‖ who can check 
arbitrary abuses of search and seizure—we still need an account of the 
nature of the right and the right‘s holder to be protected. If ―the People‖ 
serving on juries provide the remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures, we still want to know, what is the nature of this ―right of the 
people‖? It is not enough to say that we have a right to ―reasonable‖ police 
practices, because questions of reasonableness presuppose answers to 
questions concerning the analytic priority of privacy and police practice. 
These prior questions require articulation of comparative constitutional 
values involving privacy, liberty, and social good. Because ―the People‖ in 
the Fourth Amendment are ―the [same] People‖ in the First, Second, and 
Ninth Amendments, we also need to understand the role that a ―right of 
the people‖ plays in a broader scheme of ordered liberty.334 Elsewhere, 
Amar recognizes the distinctive phrasing of ―the right of the people,‖ but 
warns that ―[i]n the Fourth Amendment, as elsewhere, we need not view 
the phrase the people as sounding solely in collective, political terms . . . . 
[I]t is far from clear that populism is the core here.‖335 Mere populism is 
not the core here, but popular sovereignty is. We can see this fact only if 
we pay attention to the textual assignment of a right to ―the People,‖ who, 
with the power of words, construct a new Republic while preserving 
political liberties against arbitrary exercises of authority that would 
subvert their sovereign power. This power is political and personal, but in 
recognizing the dual function that persons play—living private lives and 
participating in public deliberation—we should not forget the importance 
of the political, as courts and commentators often do. Instead, Amar falls 
into the tradition of viewing the Amendment as protecting a right of 
individual persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
336
 
Rather than take seriously the Amendment‘s focus on a ―right of the 
people,‖ Amar suggests that ―this reading seems a bit too cute.‖337 After 
 
 
 334. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (recognizing the Constitution‘s 
protection for ―the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty‖). 
 335. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 67 (1998). He 
further observes that ―[t]he amendment‘s text seems to move quickly from the public to the private, 
from the political to the personal, from ‗the people‘ out-of-doors in conventions and suchlike to 
‗persons‘ very much indoors in their private homes.‖ Id.  
 336. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) (holding that Fourth Amendment 
rights were personal). 
 337. AMAR, supra note 335, at 65. He follows this claim with an assertion that begins with 
―surely.‖ Id. More than an assertion that ―surely‖ the Amendment intends to protect private places and 
not public assemblies is needed. A right to speak only in private accomplishes none of the deliberative 
democratic goals the First Amendment protects, and the people‘s right of free speech and public 
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all, the Fourth Amendment does mention ―persons‖ twice and ―the right of 
the people‖ only once.338 Overlooked is the idea that a plurality free from 
widespread misuse of search or seizure is important to the constitution of a 
vibrant deliberative polity.  
B. The Fourth Amendment Revised 
The problem of grammatical number emerged as a central issue to the 
Supreme Court‘s Fourth Amendment standing doctrine. When does a 
person have a protected Fourth Amendment right to privacy as an 
occupant of another person‘s dwelling? In Minnesota v. Carter, two men, 
who were temporary occupants of Kimberly Thompson‘s apartment, 
sought to assert a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in that apartment.
339
 
The Court began by claiming that ―the extent to which the Fourth 
Amendment protects people may depend upon where those people are.‖340 
Even though Katz v. United States had categorically stated that ―the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places,‖341 Supreme Court doctrine has 
evolved to protect persons only in particular places. Citing this phrase in 
Katz, the Court stated, but failed to recognize, the grammatical problem of 
the Fourth Amendment: ―The Amendment protects persons against 
unreasonable searches of ‗their persons [and] houses‘ and thus indicates 
that the Fourth Amendment is a personal right that must be invoked by an 
individual.‖342 If it is indeed a ―personal right‖ that can be invoked only by 
an individual, some explanation of the plural subject and plural possessive 
employed by the Amendment‘s text needs explaining.  
Perceiving the grammatical problem of the plural possessive, Justice 
Scalia rewrote the Amendment in his separate concurrence in order to 
resolve the difficulty.
343
 He acknowledged that ―their . . . houses‖ could be 
read to grant a person protection even when visiting a friend‘s house.344 
Rejecting this reading, he concluded that the text should be read to say 
 
 
assembly accomplishes little without Fourth Amendment protections against pervasive, even if limited 
in scope, government surveillance, search, and seizure of their public activities. Given this fact, 
―surely‖ the Amendment intends to protect a ―right of the people‖ both in and out of doors.  
 338. Amar takes this linguistic count to be significant, though he does not explain why. See 
AMAR, supra note 335, at 67 (―[T]he collective-sounding phrase the people is immediately qualified 
by the use—twice—of the more individualistic language of persons.‖). 
 339. 525 U.S. 83, 86 (1998). 
 340. Id. at 88. 
 341. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
 342. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88.  
 343. See id. at 91–99 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 344. See id. at 92. 
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―‗their respective houses,‘ so that the protection extends to each person 
only in his own house.‖345 He reasoned:  
[I]t is not linguistically possible to give the provision the . . . [more] 
expansive interpretation with respect to ―houses‖ without giving it 
the same interpretation with respect to the nouns that are parallel to 
―houses‖—―persons, . . . papers, and effects‖—which would give 
me a constitutional right not to have your person unreasonably 
searched. This is so absurd that it has to my knowledge never been 
contemplated.
346
  
Justice Scalia contrasted this ―absurd‖ interpretation with ―[t]he obvious 
meaning of the provision[, which] is that each person has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own person, 
house, papers, and effects.‖347 This ―obvious meaning‖ requires another 
rewriting to replace the plural possessive pronoun ―their‖ with the 
masculine singular phrase ―his own‖ and to render ―persons‖ and ―houses‖ 
singular. As a model of textual reading, this invites a charge that Justice 
Scalia is reading the Constitution to say what he thinks it ought to say 
rather than what it actually says.
348
  
As confirmation for his claim that the Amendment should be read to 
say ―their respective houses,‖ he notes the contrast among similar 
founding-era state constitutional provisions. For example, Pennsylvania‘s 
Constitution provided ―[t]hat the people have a right to hold themselves, 
their houses, papers, and possessions free from search and seizure . . . .‖349 
By contrast, Massachusetts‘s Constitution provided: ―Every subject has a 
right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his 
 
 
 345. Id.  
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. This is precisely the kind of complaint Justice Scalia levies against those engaged in what he 
calls ―The Living Constitution‖ method of constitutional interpretation, which, as he explains, reads 
the Constitution ―in order that the Constitution might mean what it ought to mean . . . . If it is good, it 
is so. Never mind the text that we are supposedly construing.‖ SCALIA, supra note 316, at 39; see also 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–64 (1989). As we have 
already noted, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the ―right of the people‖ in the 
Second Amendment was a personal right. Regarding the reasoning of this opinion, Reva Siegel notes: 
―Heller‘s account of the Second Amendment‘s original public meaning invokes authorities from 
before and after the founding, relies on common law-like reasoning, endows judges with vast amounts 
of interpretive discretion, and, in these respects, resembles the practice of living constitutionalism that 
Justice Scalia often condemns.‖ Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular 
Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 196 (2008).  
 349. PA. CONST. art. X (1776) (emphasis added).  
  
 
 
 
 
2010] THE POLITICAL FOURTH AMENDMENT 365 
 
 
 
 
person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.‖350 Justice Scalia 
concluded that ―[t]here [was] no indication anyone believed‖ that there 
was a difference in the protections afforded depending on whether ―his‖ or 
―their‖ was used.351 That might be true regarding a claim about who might 
seek a remedy for the violation of the right, but there is a big difference in 
theory and practice between a right of a ―subject‖ and one of ―the People.‖ 
Provisions protecting a ―right of the people,‖ paired with a plural 
possessive pronoun, indicate a different understanding of the right and the 
right holder than provisions referencing ―every subject.‖ ―[T]he People‖ 
refers to the sovereign political body, whereas ―every subject‖ seems to 
refer to individual subjects of a governing body. This difference is 
important for reading the Fourth Amendment as protecting a right of a 
political body, not just a right of the person subject to a governing 
authority. Justice Scalia ignores this important textual difference in his 
constitutional revision.  
In rejecting the Carter defendants‘ claim invoking a Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy in the home of another person, the Court‘s 
decision implicated important forms of social life. As a matter of everyday 
social practice, we live in the company of others, sharing our private 
spaces as well as our private thoughts with others.
352
 If a person sheds her 
Fourth Amendment right the moment she leaves the sanctity of her own 
house and enters that of another, then the Fourth Amendment fails to apply 
to much of our shared social practices.
353
 If Fourth Amendment 
protections are based on ―reasonable expectations of privacy,‖ however, 
and if we regularly share our lives with others in each others‘ homes with 
the full expectation that government officials will not intrude upon that 
privacy, then a person should have Fourth Amendment protections even 
when in the home of another. Moreover, Fourth Amendment text—absent 
any rewriting—explicitly supports such a view by its use of the plural 
possessive pronoun ―their‖ with the plural noun ―houses.‖ Despite the 
majority‘s holding that the Carter defendants did not have a protected 
 
 
 350. MASS. CONST. art. XIV (1780) (emphasis added).  
 351. Carter, 525 U.S. at 93–94 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 352. See Coombs, supra note 11, at 1635 (―A view of the world that recognizes the essential 
interconnectedness of people and the importance of intimacy and sharing is foreign to the atomistic 
social theory underlying the Court‘s present doctrine.‖). 
 353. Concerning the Court‘s conclusion that ―society recognizes and permits no expectation of 
privacy, except for the persons on whose premises the encounter took place,‖ Professor Weinreb 
claims that ―[t]he assertion is so plainly incorrect that one has to wonder not whether it is mistaken but 
only how the mistake can have been made.‖ Lloyd L. Weinreb, Your Place or Mine? Privacy of 
Presence Under the Fourth Amendment, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 263. 
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right of privacy while bagging cocaine in Ms. Thompson‘s apartment, five 
Justices supported the view that, at minimum, ―almost all social guests 
have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against 
unreasonable searches, in their host‘s home.‖354 Four Justices went further, 
claiming that ―people are not genuinely ‗secure in their . . . houses . . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures,‘ if their invitations to others 
increase the risk of unwarranted governmental peering and prying into 
their dwelling places.‖355 If we take seriously the actual forms of shared 
social life, as well as Fourth Amendment grammar, we have a right to be 
secure in our houses—yours and mine.  
A problem concerning standing nonetheless remains—whether we 
emphasize the ―right of the people‖ or ―a personal right‖356 of individuals. 
Can I have an enforceable right against the illegal search of your person, 
papers, or effects?
357
 Perhaps not, but I do have a right to live in a society 
free from illegal searches, just as I enjoy a right to live in a society 
uninhibited in the free exchange of ideas. For me to invoke a judicially 
enforceable remedy for the illegal search of your effects might very well 
be ―absurd,‖ as Justice Scalia asserts.358 My privacy is not invaded when 
your papers are searched. Nor is my privacy invaded when your person is 
searched. Even if ―the People‖ have a right to be secure in ―their . . . 
persons,‖ it is difficult to understand how I could have an enforceable right 
to a remedy when the police violate your right to be secure from 
unreasonable searches or seizures. This difficulty derives from the nature 
of the remedy sought: exclusion of evidence.  
Since the right and the exclusionary rule are closely related, if the 
Court wishes to limit the use of the exclusionary rule, it may limit the 
scope of the right. But not always. In Michigan v. Hudson, the Court 
refused to apply the exclusionary rule where a clear violation of the Fourth 
Amendment had occurred.
359
 Reasoning that the Fourth Amendment 
protected the common-law rule that police must knock and announce their 
 
 
 354. Carter, 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Someone with a stronger connection to the 
homeowner and the dwelling, such as an overnight guest, has a Fourth Amendment protected 
expectation of privacy. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 
257 (1960).  
 355. Carter, 525 U.S. at 108 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).  
 356. Id. at 88 (majority opinion). 
 357. The Court has held that ―[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only 
through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person‘s premises or 
property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.‖ Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
134 (1978).  
 358. Carter, 525 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 359. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).  
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presence before entering a dwelling,
360
 the Court nonetheless concluded 
that the social cost of not admitting evidence that police were entitled to 
discover outweighed the harm perpetrated by the constitutional 
violation.
361
 As we have already seen, the Court extended this rationale in 
Herring v. United States, arguing that the exclusionary rule‘s primary 
purpose is to deter police misconduct.
362
 Under the Court‘s cost-benefit 
analysis, when the social cost is high and the deterrence is low, even 
admitted constitutional violations do not merit exclusion of the illegally 
obtained evidence. By contrast, in other cases, the Court has narrowed the 
scope of the right in order to avoid the exclusion of evidence. For 
example, in Illinois v. Rakas, the Court held that a vehicle passenger could 
not obtain the benefit of the exclusionary rule when the vehicle owner‘s 
constitutional rights were violated.
363
 The Court claimed that ―since the 
exclusionary rule is an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment, . . . it is proper to permit only defendants whose Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated to benefit from the rule‘s 
protections.‖364 Because the passenger does not have a property interest or 
an expectation of privacy in the car owned by another, the passenger has 
no Fourth Amendment right that can be violated. In part, therefore, the 
apparent ―absurdity‖ in my having a right to your person not being 
illegally searched is related to a separate question about who may claim 
the benefit of the exclusionary rule and when they may do so. Two 
considerations complicate the Court‘s interpretation.  
First, if we divorce the right from the remedy, it is not at all clear why 
it would be ―absurd‖ for me to have ―a constitutional right not to have 
your person unreasonably searched.‖365 In other contexts, I can invoke 
another person‘s right. For example, I can invoke third-party rights in the 
First Amendment context to vindicate the free speech rights of others.
366
 I 
may not be able to collect damages for the constitutional harm perpetrated, 
but I can obtain a declaratory judgment or an injunction. The First 
Amendment harm arises from a restraint on speech because the 
 
 
 360. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 
(1995).  
 361. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594–99. 
 362. 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009); see supra notes 141–68 and accompanying text. 
 363. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).  
 364. Id. at 134 (citations omitted).  
 365. Carter, 525 U.S. at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 366. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002) (employing overbreadth 
analysis); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (same). See generally Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991).  
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background constitutional assumption is that persons should not be chilled 
in their ability to engage in public discussion, ―[f]or speech concerning 
public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government.‖367 As the Court so eloquently explained: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public 
discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced 
largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such 
freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity . . . .
368
 
When a government official censors a particular person‘s speech, ―the 
People‖ suffer. They suffer not merely because they have a right to hear, 
but because public discourse requires a multiplicity of voices. In a republic 
in which ―the People‖ are sovereign, ―debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open‖369 in order to foster democratic 
deliberation over the pressing issues of the day. We cannot always 
anticipate what views others might express, what new ideas they may 
contribute, or what futures they may seek to create. More than a personal 
interest in the individual‘s own ability to speak, we share an interest in 
each other‘s unconstrained capacity to speak. In order to establish 
informed views on public matters, one must be able to hear what others 
have to express and engage them in reciprocal debate.
370
 If in the First 
Amendment context it is not ―absurd‖ to think that one person might have 
an interest in another person‘s free speech rights, perhaps the Fourth 
Amendment provides similar protections for ―the People‘s‖ right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Second, even if exclusion of evidence were unavailable, it would not 
necessarily follow that I could have no right to the security of your person, 
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Just 
because I cannot claim a remedy for a specific violation of your Fourth 
 
 
 367. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964).  
 368. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).  
 369. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).  
 370. To emphasize the public deliberative value of the First Amendment, one need not commit to 
Alexander Meiklejohn‘s view that ―[t]he primary purpose of the First Amendment is . . . that all the 
citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.‖ 
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 
(1960); see also OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and 
Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408–11 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Free Speech and Social 
Structure].  
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Amendment right to be secure in your papers does not mean that I do not 
have a right as one of ―the People‖ to live in a society free from this kind 
of government interference. If police regularly violate our neighbors‘ 
rights to their security, we can have no security in our own homes against 
illegal searches and seizures. Even if we cannot seek judicial remedies, 
especially through the exclusion of evidence, against officials who violate 
our neighbors‘ rights, the polity nonetheless suffers from the constitutional 
violation. Like a chilling effect on the public sphere that undermines 
public deliberative participation, placing pressure on persons to return to 
their individual ―private‖ worlds to seek refuge from government searches 
and surveillance diminishes the public sphere‘s security. Words spoken to 
oneself in the privacy of one‘s home fail to further First Amendment 
values, and life lived secreted away from others in a sphere of personal 
privacy fails to fulfill the Fourth Amendment‘s promise. Linking the First 
and Fourth Amendment interests in public deliberation, Justice Douglas 
dissented in United States v. White from the Court‘s ―assumption of risk‖ 
rationale that rendered unprotected any information revealed to others.
371
 
He wrote:  
 Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and 
spontaneous utterances. Free discourse—a First Amendment 
value—may be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary 
or revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not free if there is 
surveillance. . . . This is the essence of the idea of privacy implicit 
in the First and Fifth Amendments as well as in the Fourth.
372
 
In another confidential informant case, as we saw at the beginning of this 
Article, Justice Douglas warned of government practices ―when the most 
confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying 
ears. When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone.‖373 
In these impassioned dissents, Justice Douglas treats the constitutional 
harm as one that ―the People‖ suffer, not merely one that the individual 
criminal defendant endures. But to see this harm, one must capture a wider 
vision of the Fourth Amendment‘s purpose. Focused on the narrow 
question of regulating police practice and the sometimes uncomfortable 
exclusionary remedy, the Court regularly fails to see the broader 
implications of a collective ―right of the people‖ to be secure in the liberty 
 
 
 371. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 372. Id. at 762–63. 
 373. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 354 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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of multiple aspects of their lives. When the question concerns a personal 
right of privacy, these collective harms go unnoticed.  
As Supreme Court doctrine has developed, Fourth Amendment privacy 
has become primarily a right to keep information to oneself. ―It is well 
settled that when an individual reveals private information to another, he 
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the 
authorities,‖374 with no Fourth Amendment constraints. Under this ―third-
party‖ doctrine, one assumes the risk of exposing to government officials 
anything one fails to keep entirely to oneself. Because the Court has 
construed privacy narrowly, the Fourth Amendment fails to protect much 
about our social lives shared in the company of other persons.
375
 
Understood in this manner, it would indeed be ―absurd‖ to think that I 
have any constitutional interest in the invasions of your privacy. Privacy, 
so construed, is intrinsically personal. On this account, ―the right of the 
people‖ could only be the isolated personal right of the private individual.  
Narrowly focusing on a personal right to privacy ignores the ―numeric 
problem‖ of ―the right of the people,‖ who appear in different guises as 
individual persons and as a collective people. Persons can be viewed as 
individual persons who enjoy the particular ―Blessings of Liberty‖ in their 
private lives and homes, and simultaneously they can be viewed as part of 
a collective political body that has a popular sovereign right to the 
―Blessings of Liberty‖ in their public and political lives. To appreciate this 
dual aspect, we must recognize that, at times, something more than an 
individual right is at stake. For example, a First Amendment ―right of the 
people to peaceably assemble‖ is one that can be invoked by individual 
persons while simultaneously protecting collective interests. Privacy 
protections are only particular manifestations of political liberties. More 
than self-expression, the First Amendment protects a value that is 
collective and public. ―At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle 
that in a free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with 
other persons in public places.‖376 They do so in order to make possible 
 
 
 374. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).  
 375. I develop this argument further in Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth 
Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1, 32–48 (2009). 
 376. Int‘l Soc‘y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). As Alexander Meiklejohn recognized in the First Amendment context, I have an interest 
in your right to speak so that I might decide how to vote. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 192, at 26 (―What 
is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said.‖). Owen 
Fiss captured the thought best: ―We allow people to speak so others can vote. Speech allows people to 
vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all the relevant information.‖ 
Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 370, at 1410. But see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's 
Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1117 
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the political realization of popular sovereignty, the very people the Fourth 
Amendment seeks to protect. More than personal privacy, the Fourth 
Amendment protects a value of noninterference in our everyday lives that 
makes possible the political appearance of popular sovereignty, ―the [very] 
People‖ on whom the First Amendment depends. Recognizing the textual 
significance of protecting a ―right of the people‖ allows the Court to see 
the individual case as part of a collective interest.  
In order to see the Fourth Amendment‘s broader role within the 
Constitution that does more than regulate police practice, we must take 
seriously the fact that the Fourth Amendment‘s textual purpose is to secure 
a ―right of the people,‖ which places it textually alongside the First, 
Second, and Ninth Amendments that similarly seek to protect ―rights of 
the people.‖ ―[T]he People‖ who assemble in the First Amendment and 
―the People‖ who have a right ―to keep and bear arms‖ in the Second are 
―the [same] People‖ who have a right ―to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.‖ This same political body created a new polity 
out of a commitment to words ordained in the voice of ―We the People.‖377 
To ignore the political importance of the Fourth Amendment‘s protections, 
and to remain anachronistically focused on the practices of an institution 
whose existence was not yet imagined, is to miss entirely an available 
guiding feature of constitutional text and design.
378
 It also misses 
important conceptual connections among the various constitutional values 
that form the system of liberties whose blessings the Constitution seeks to 
secure.  
IV. SECURING LIBERTY AS A FOURTH AMENDMENT VALUE 
Privacy is not the only right at stake. The Fourth Amendment also 
protects rights to security and liberty.
379
 In an early and still relevant case, 
the Supreme Court observed: ―It is not the breaking of his doors, and the 
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but 
 
 
(1993) (―The difficulty with Meiklejohn‘s analysis . . . is that it reflects an insufficiently radical 
conception of the reach of self-determination . . . .‖).  
 377. See generally H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION 
IN HISTORY AND POLITICS (2002).  
 378. Amar first argued that ―[p]lacing the Fourth Amendment in criminal procedure thus distorts, 
causing us to see things that are not there.‖ AMAR, supra note 26, at 2.  
 379. See Clancy, supra note 35, at 307; Rubenfeld, supra note 35, at 131 (arguing that the Fourth 
Amendment should be focused on asking ―whether the search-and-seizure power the state has asserted 
could be generalized without destroying the people‘s right of security‖); see also Crocker, From 
Privacy to Liberty, supra note 375, at 56 (arguing that ―Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be 
refocused in light of the protections provided interpersonal liberty‖). 
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it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property . . . .‖380 Similarly, in his persuasive dissent in 
Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis observed: ―Decency, security 
and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to 
the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen.‖381 Although 
neither security nor liberty have been central to recent Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence—focused as it has been on the Katz expectations of privacy 
framework—it does not follow that they are not core values the 
Amendment also seeks to protect. The importance of security is made 
explicit in the Amendment‘s text, and ―secur[ing] the Blessings of 
Liberty‖382 defines a central constitutional purpose. 
The ―right of the people‖ contemplates popular and public acts 
constitutive of a political body. It may not appear in revolutionary garb, 
assembled and ready to petition for redress of grievances or ready to 
embark on a constitutional convention. ―[T]he People‘s‖ failure to appear 
is one reason why the privacy rights of particular persons are always 
readily in view. Everyday constitutional claims bring the individual 
criminal defendant into view, making it difficult to see ―‗a more majestic 
conception‘ of the Fourth Amendment.‖383 But appearances can be 
deceiving. When employing the exclusionary rule, we sometimes set the 
guilty free when state officials violate constitutional constraints, not 
merely to protect the innocent, but to establish a constitutional culture in 
which constitutional commitments matter to daily life. Constitutional 
commitments are not merely abstract principles existing in some rarified 
Platonic form, awaiting a ―bevy of guardians‖ to give them authoritative 
interpretation.
384
 Rather, constitutional commitments shape our everyday 
experiences through our interactions with governing officials.  
By initiating a privacy revolution in constitutional criminal procedure, 
Katz was right to focus on social (public) aspects of life. Katz was wrong, 
however, to focus solely on what social expectations thought about 
personal privacy as a way of regulating police practice.
385
 Even though 
 
 
 380. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).  
 381. 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).  
 382. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  
 383. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, at 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 384. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) (objecting to being ―ruled by a bevy of 
Platonic Guardians‖). 
 385. For one thing, ―Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is circular, for someone can have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in an area if and only if the Court has held that a search in that area 
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protecting a space of private repose free from unwarranted government 
intrusion may be necessary to enable the full political participation of 
persons, it is not sufficient. Protection for the public appearance of ―the 
People‖ in their everyday social practices is also necessary. The additional 
Fourth Amendment question Katz left unasked is what social expectations 
exist for liberty that enable persons to conduct a public life free from 
unwanted and unwarranted intrusion.  
The Court in Lawrence v. Texas provides a basis for reading the Fourth 
Amendment as part of a Constitution focused on protecting liberty and not 
only on privacy.
386
 Justice Kennedy begins the majority opinion in 
Lawrence v. Texas without citations, bringing together principles derived 
from cases protecting both privacy and liberty.
387
 These principles have 
different doctrinal locations situated among the Constitution‘s rights-
protecting clauses. From the first word of the opinion, however, the textual 
focus is on liberty, not privacy:  
 Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government 
intrusions into a dwelling or other private places. In our tradition the 
State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of 
our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should 
not be a dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial 
bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes 
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. 
The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and 
in its more transcendent dimensions.
388
 
Beginning like a Fourth Amendment case, the opinion quickly moves 
through substantive due process concerns over ―spheres of our lives‖ to 
First Amendment values of ―freedom of thought, belief, and expression,‖ 
suggesting that the Constitution protects liberty through an interrelated 
web of textual connections.
389
 Without citations, we are invited to read the 
Constitution‘s protection for liberty holistically as purposing to ―secure the 
Blessings of Liberty‖ in all their manifestations. Moreover, Justice 
Kennedy acknowledges that liberty is realized in multiple ways, unlike the 
Court‘s increasingly narrow understanding of privacy as secret. 
 
 
would be unreasonable.‖ Michael Abramowicz, Constitutional Circularity, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60–
61 (2001).  
 386. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 387. Id. at 562. 
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Lawrence has already proven frustrating for lower courts, as well as 
scholars, who cannot locate clear decision rules to implement the 
announced constitutional norms.
390
 As the dissent argues, the majority 
opinion resists implementing a doctrinal framework of ―tiered scrutiny‖ 
and identification of fundamental rights under due process.
391
 In the 
dissent‘s eyes, this is a fundamental flaw. What tiered scrutiny does, 
however, is ask the Court to calibrate its vision within a specific doctrinal 
framework before it ever confronts substantive constitutional issues.
392
 By 
resisting this doctrinal straitjacket, the Lawrence Court is able to look 
more broadly at the effects on the liberty and dignity of the persons subject 
to stigmatizing criminal laws. The focus is directed to the liberty interests 
persons have when they share their lives in interpersonal relationships 
with others, not on how exactly the Court should examine these liberty 
interests. ―The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, 
whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the 
liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.‖393 
Without a rigid application of tiered scrutiny, we are invited to look more 
holistically at enduring liberty interests protected by the Constitution that 
―persons in every generation can invoke . . . in their own search for greater 
freedom.‖394 When we do so, we readily see how the Constitution protects 
―spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State 
 
 
 390. The Ninth Circuit held, concerning the military‘s Don‘t Ask, Don‘t Tell policy, that ―when 
the government attempts to intrude upon the personal and private lives of homosexuals, in a manner 
that implicates the rights identified in Lawrence,‖ it must justify its intrusion to satisfy a heightened 
standard of judicial review. Witt v. Dep‘t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 819 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5th Cir. 2008) (―The case . . . is about 
controlling what people do in the privacy of their own homes because the State is morally opposed to a 
certain type of consensual private intimate conduct. This is an insufficient justification for the statute 
after Lawrence.‖). But see Williams v. Att‘y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (an 
Alabama antiobscenity statute prohibiting the sale of sex toys did not violate a fundamental right under 
Lawrence). Although Lawrence has been widely applauded by scholars, there remain many 
unanswered interpretive questions. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Of “This” and “That” in Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 75, 76 (―[T]he language and reasoning of the opinion frequently point in a 
direction, but when the careful reader follows the text in that direction, it reverses itself or dissolves 
into ambiguity.‖); Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2004) (―The 
Court in Lawrence strikes down the Texas law without characterizing its test for doing so . . .‖); 
Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (―Lawrence is a case about liberty 
that has important implications for the jurisprudence of equality.‖); Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty After 
Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059, 1060 (2004) (―I am not comfortable with the Lawrence opinion, 
partly because of its opacity, partly because of its breadth and ambition, and partly because of its use 
of the idea of substantive due process.‖). 
 391. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (―Not once does [the Court] describe 
homosexual sodomy as a ‗fundamental right‘ or a ‗fundamental liberty interest‘ . . . .‖). 
 392. See Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
 393. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  
 394. Id. at 579.  
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should not be a dominant presence.‖395 These spheres contain the same 
interests in political liberty the Fourth Amendment purposes to protect.  
Lawrence is no doubt a due process case, striking down a criminal 
statute that denigrated the lives and dignity of homosexual persons. But 
Lawrence also makes salient the Constitution‘s protections for liberty 
across a number of doctrinal frameworks, purposefully glossing over the 
specific decision rules designed to implement constitutional principles.
396
 
As a model of constitutional interpretation, it suggests that specific 
substantive issues can be addressed by examining larger constitutional 
contexts. The Lawrence Court did not first decide a tier of scrutiny and 
then balance the state‘s interests and chosen means against the nature of 
the right affected. Lawrence began where the Constitution itself begins, 
with the ―Blessings of Liberty‖ that ―We the People‖ sought to secure.  
Using Lawrence as a model for examining Fourth Amendment issues 
requires courts to look at the broader implications of everyday social 
practice when making particular decisions. Moreover, it requires 
rethinking the ―third-party‖ doctrine. Having a certain amount of security 
in the ability to interact with other persons free from the fear that they are 
effective agents of the state is analogous to speaking without fear of 
seditious libel. Security in everyday commerce with others is part of the 
essence of political liberty. Although the ―third-party‖ doctrine provides 
scant privacy protection against pervasive government surveillance 
through data mining and other activities, a Fourth Amendment attuned to 
the liberty interests of persons would provide more robust grounds for 
regulation. Just as First Amendment activities may be chilled by overly 
broad regulations of speech, ―the People‘s‖ political life lived in the 
company of others, both in and out of doors, can be chilled. And just as 
the First Amendment is doctrinally attuned to this prospect, a reoriented 
Fourth Amendment should be as well.  
It remains to be seen how a reoriented Fourth Amendment doctrine will 
interact with Fourth Amendment remedies. This Article is motivated in 
part by the lack of remedies for intrusive government practices where it is 
plausible to think that remedies should exist. Conceptualizing the right to 
privacy narrowly as what remains undisclosed to others narrows the need 
for remedies, as does attending to the needs of police practices. Likewise, 
emphasizing the burden of demonstrating substantial deterrent effects on 
police practice limits the exclusionary rule‘s use. To militate against this 
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narrowing remedial trend, new articulations of Fourth Amendment rights 
will occasion further interactions with remedial circumstances. While this 
Article‘s argument need not be taken as an example of ―rights 
essentialism‖ that rigidly separates questions of constitutional meaning 
from remedies,
397
 it does proceed from the assumption that constitutional 
reconstruction occurs when social practices interact with constitutional 
principles. Writing against the view that there is a formal separation 
between the meaning of the Constitution and its implementation, Professor 
Hills argues that ―pragmatically speaking, the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is its implementation.‖398 But implementation can take many 
forms, and in so doing, the life of a constitutional provision takes place 
within multiple and mutually informing practices. My argument need not 
appeal to a conception of constitutional rights so robust as to invoke the 
―true meaning of the Constitution,‖399 but it does appeal to an existing 
conception in need of further articulation and implementation.
400
 
Protecting a right of the people to engage in shared public political life is 
one available meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It may not be its 
essence, but it is a meaning that responds to growing pressures of an 
interactive, digitally networked social world, giving life to a constitutional 
provision increasingly moribund under the weight of its own present 
doctrinal implementation. Moreover, as we have seen in the case of 
Herring, even Justices who implement the exclusionary rule seem willing 
to admit a gap exists between acknowledged unconstitutional behavior and 
the decision rule the Court applies. In time, this gap may disappear as we 
come to think of the right as extending no further than the remedy. But for 
now, the relationship between right and remedy is unsettled, as the shifting 
majorities and contrasting narratives of Gant and Herring demonstrate. 
The unsettled state of the doctrine, combined with social practices affected 
 
 
 397. Daryl Levinson criticizes ―rights essentialism‖ as the view that ―begins with the 
identification or definition of the constitutional right, and only then proceeds to application of the right 
in a real world context, where thoughts of remedy first come into play.‖ Daryl J. Levinson, Rights 
Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 861 (1999). 
 398. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006). 
 399. Roosevelt, supra note 176, at 1653.  
 400. On the view that there is a gap between the Supreme Court‘s implementation of 
constitutional rights and constitutional meaning, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision 
Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: 
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by government practices, make it possible to reconceptualize the Fourth 
Amendment narrative. 
What makes one Fourth Amendment narrative more salient than 
another?
401
 Why might an anachronistic fixation on regulating police 
prove nonetheless compelling? As we have seen, narratives of both police 
regulation and privacy protection circulate through Supreme Court 
opinions, constructing sometimes incongruent rationales applied to 
disparate factual settings. One explanation, institutional in origin, is that 
the Warren Court expanded constitutional protections for criminal 
procedures, focusing on protecting individual rights, while the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and now Roberts Courts have curtailed those protections, 
emphasizing public order.
402
 As we have seen, these differences depend on 
different constitutional visions of what constitute the core purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. Another explanation is that these differences are 
driven by pressures created by policing practices.
403
 Responding to 
widespread reports of police abuse, the Court used constitutional 
principles to cabin police discretion. When the modern police force 
became more professionalized and more democratically accountable, the 
need for robust constitutional regulation waned. As the Court itself has 
argued, a ―development over the past half-century that deters civil-rights 
violations is the increasing professionalism of police forces.‖404 Each of 
these explanations no doubt plays a role, making clear that no single 
metanarrative explains the ultimate choice between operative Fourth 
Amendment narratives.  
Each narrative, however, must be responsive to intergenerational 
constitutional conversations.
405
 After all, it is a constitution we are 
interpreting.
406
 When the Court focuses on specific doctrinal decisional 
 
 
 401. Making particular issues constitutionally relevant is the first step in deriving constitutional 
answers. Which issues and what answers create the framework for a constitutional culture. See 
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of 
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (defining ―constitutional salience—the 
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 402. See Steiker, supra note 90, at 2468 (―[T]he Court has clearly become less sympathetic to 
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 405. See Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 316, at 1805 (making the ―case for a 
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rules in relative isolation from other constitutional principles, it is blind to 
the overall import of broader constitutional norms. Narratives focused on 
regulating police or protecting privacy each risk blinding us to the Fourth 
Amendment‘s broader constitutional setting. By looking at the historic 
origins of the Fourth Amendment in relation to substantive First 
Amendment concerns, and by examining the textual significance of 
protecting a ―right of the people,‖ this Article argues that the two 
dominant narratives overlook a central political purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment. The political Fourth Amendment seeks to protect the 
political liberties of the sovereign People who live their lives in public and 
shared spaces. Reading the Fourth Amendment‘s protection for the ―rights 
of the people‖ in relation to the First Amendment‘s guarantees of free 
speech and ―the right of the people to peaceably assemble and petition‖ 
allows us to see how free speech can depend on the security of persons 
occupying both public and private places.  
CONCLUSION 
The political Fourth Amendment may not change many doctrinal 
outcomes. It does, however, provide a constitutional basis for closer 
examination of more pervasive practices of public surveillance. Adding a 
substantive inquiry into the effects on political liberty of state practices 
could increase the cost of criminal law enforcement. Police work could 
become more difficult if, in addition to expectations of privacy, the police 
were limited by the liberty and dignity interests of persons. There is no 
avoiding the fact that using the Constitution to regulate criminal procedure 
increases the cost of criminal investigations. But the costs of continuing 
dissonance between the perception of protected constitutional liberties and 
the doctrinal reality of protecting privacy and regulating police may be 
even worse. We are led to believe that the Constitution protects against 
widespread surveillance when it, in fact, does not. As Carol Steiker has 
argued, under the present system, people often believe that the 
Constitution provides robust procedural protections, reducing the need for 
democratic pressure on the enactment, investigation, and prosecution of 
criminal laws.
407
 The public frequently may have false beliefs about 
constitutional criminal procedure, thereby distorting public policy. A more 
robust protection of liberty interests could aid in removing some of this 
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distortion, reorienting actual constitutional protections with popular 
political conceptions.  
What is more, a robust conception of Fourth Amendment liberty has an 
impressive conceptual, textual, and historical basis. Conceptually, we can 
associate our interests in public deliberation with our interests in security 
from government interference in both our private and public lives. If we 
take seriously the fact that the Fourth Amendment‘s textual purpose is to 
secure a ―right of the people,‖ which places it textually alongside the First, 
Second, and Ninth Amendments that similarly seek to protect ―rights of 
the people,‖ it is far easier to see the Fourth Amendment as part of a 
broader constitutional narrative. In this expanded narrative, we see much 
more than an invitation to regulate police practice or to protect privacy. 
Instead, we see a mandate to secure liberties necessary for the democratic 
flourishing of the polity through social and public interaction. Let me 
hasten to add that text and history do not compel us to reconstruct the 
Fourth Amendment in this manner. Rather, text and history make available 
a way of understanding how the Fourth Amendment connects with other 
liberty-protecting provisions, such as the First Amendment, to protect 
public life. The responsibility remains ours—citizens, legal practitioners, 
and judges—to implement these available meanings. 
It is my contention that doctrinal development follows from 
constitutional vision. How the Court sees the constitutional issue, and 
what the Court sees as the governing values and purposes, will drive 
doctrinal development. This is not to make a claim about social 
cognition.
408
 Rather, it is a conceptual claim about how constitutional 
meanings work. No doubt, social cognition influences one‘s ability to see 
the salience of issues and arguments. But social cognition must be driven 
by the availability of particular conceptual and discursive materials. My 
argument focuses on this possibility of constructing new constitutional 
visions from rearticulated constitutional conceptualizations. Reading the 
Fourth Amendment back into the Constitution makes available new 
grounds for the Constitution‘s relevance in an age of pervasive electronic 
surveillance.  
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